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JUVENILE DETENTION HEARINGS: A
PROPOSED MODEL PROVISION TO
LIMIT DISCRETION DURING THE
PREADJUDICATORY STAGE
I. Introduction
The current juvenile court system evolved from the efforts of re-
formers who sought to improve the treatment of minors' who had
committed or who were likely to commit offenses. 2 Reformers at-
tempted to make procedures within the system flexible and informal
without the technicalities they concluded were present in the criminal
law system. 3 To advance these goals, broad discretionary power was
conferred upon decision-makers working within the system .4 This
broad discretionary power, still reflected in current juvenile codes, 5
consitutes a flaw in the juvenile court system because it creates the risk
that decisions will be arbitrary and will lack well-defined bases.0
1. Statutes identifying those individuals who fall within the jurisdiction of state
juvenile court systems employ the terms "juvenile," "minor" and "child." See, e.g.,
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3101(2)(A) (1980) (exclusive jurisdiction conferred
upon juvenile court when juvenile is alleged to have commited juvenile crime); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 62.040(1)(c) (1983) (juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction over pro-
ceedings pertaining to child who lives in or is found within county and who has acted
in delinquent manner); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:6(I) (1981) (anyone may file
written petition alleging that minor has behaved in delinquent manner). This Note
uses these terms interchangeably.
2. AM. LAW INST./AM. BAR Ass'N. COMM. ON CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL
EDUC., LAW AND TACTICS IN JUVENILE CASES 5 (3d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as LAW
AND TACTICS]; D. BESHAROV, JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVOCACY, PRACTICE IN A UNIQUE
COURT 1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as BESHAROV]. See infra notes 20-21 and accompa-
nying text for a description of the reform efforts that culminated in the establishment
of the first juvenile court.
3. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967). For a comparison of the treatment of
juveniles processed through the juvenile court system and adults processed through
the adult criminal court system, see infra note 29.
4. See Hasenfeld & Sarri, The Juvenile Court Reexamined in BROUGHT TO
JUSTICE? JUVENILES, THE COURTS, AND THE LAW 207, 214 (R. Sarri & Y. Hasenfeld
eds. 1976) (pursuant to doctrine of parens patriae, wide discretionary power was
conferred upon juvenile court to enable it to deal with variety of juvenile problems)
[hereinafter cited as Hasenfeld, The Juvenile Court Reexamined]. For a description
of the doctrine of parens patriae, see infra note 21 and accompanying text.
5. See LAW AND TACTICS, supra note 2, at 8.
6. See id. at 18; INST. OF JUDICIAL ADMIN.-AM. BAR Ass'N JOINT COMM'N ON
JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS [hereinafter referred to as IJA-ABA JOINT COMMISSION],
INTERIM STATUS: THE RELEASE, CONTROL, AND DETENTION OF ACCUSED JUVENILE
OFFENDERS BETWEEN ARREST AND DISPOSITION 1-4 (1976) [hereinafter cited as INTERIM
STATUS]; Hasenfeld, The Juvenile Court Reexamined, supra note 4, at 215.
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A critical stage of decision-making in the juvenile court system
begins when a police officer encounters a juvenile. 7 The officer has a
number of options available to him: he may (1) question the juvenile,
(2) search the juvenile, (3) send or return the juvenile home, or (4)
take the juvenile into custody to question him further or to hold him
pending an investigation. 8 If the police officer decides to take the child
into custody, another and equally important determination in the
decision-making process must be made." This second decision, ren-
dered by a probation officer or intake worker, reviews the necessity
for the retention of custody over the child. ' 0 If the child is detained,''
another determination regarding his continued custody pending fu-
ture court proceedings must be made. 12 This decision must be re-
viewed judicially and an independent determination rendered by the
court before the detention of the child is continued.13 Procedures that
place few limitations upon decision-makers during this stage of the
juvenile court process increase the risk that the juvenile will be unnec-
essarily detained, to the detriment of both the youth and the commu-
nity. 1
7. S. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES, THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 3-11 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as RIGHTS OF JUVENILES]. See also LAW AND TACTICS, supra note 2,
at 181 (police officer usually renders initial decision to assume custody of child); Nat'l
Council on Crime and Delinquency, Correction in the United States, 13 CiUME &
DELINQUENCY 11, 29 (1967) (police usually make first decision whether to detain or
release youth) [hereinafter cited as Corrections].
8. RIGHTS OF JUVENILES, supra note 7, at 3-12 See also NAT'L ADVISORY COMM.
ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION 190 (1976) (every state allows law enforcement officers to take child into
custody for same reasons that adult can be subjected to arrest; furthermore, states
often authorize such officials to take child into custody when he has run away from
home, has been neglected, or is ill or injured and needs treatment) [hereinafter cited
as TASK FORCE REPORT].
9. See RIGHTS OF JUVENILES, supra note 7, at 3-35.
10. LAW AND TACTICS, supra note 2, at 181; Corrections, supra note 7, at 30. See
also RIGHTS OF JUVENILES, supra note 7, at 3-35 (often juveniles are taken into custody
without warrant or summons; issue to be resolved is whether child is to be placed in
care of his parents, held pending investigation or confined).
11. For a definition of detention, see infra text accompanying note 30.
12. See RIGHTS OF JUVENILES, supra note 7, at 3-37; Corrections, supra note 7, at
30.
13. BESHAROV, supra note 2, at 229. The court determination concerning the
continued detention of the juvenile is a critical decision in three respects. First, a
court order which dictate_ that a child be detained has relevance regarding the final
outcome of the case. Second, the decision to detain will affect how the court catego-
rizes the particular juvenile in the future. Third, when the juvenile is placed into a
detention facility, the defense counsel's tactical and strategical choices are limited
because of a desire to have the adjudicatory stage begin as soon as possible. Id.
14. See INTERIM STATUS, supra note 6, at 3-4; TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8,
at 374.
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To curb unnecessary pretrial detention, organizations that have
drafted juvenile court standards suggest that a detention hearing auto-
matically be held when a child is not released within a specified
period of time.15 Most jurisdictions in the United States authorize the
holding of a detention hearing' 6 to consider the matter of the contin-
ued detention of the child pending future court proceedings.' 7 Re-
15. See, e.g., TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, Standard 12.11, at 401; NAT'L
ADVISORY COMM. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, STANDARDS
FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, Standard 3.155, at 303 (1980) [herein-
after cited as JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS]; INTERIM STATUS, supra note 6, Standard
7.6, at 85.
16. In New York, the detention hearing is called the "initial appearance." See
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 320.4 (McKinney Pt. 2 1983). One jurisdiction refers to the
detention hearing simply as a "hearing." See, COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-102(1) (1978).
For purposes of clarity, this Note uses only the term "detention hearing." Some
detention hearing schemes apply to confinement in detention or secure facilities as
well as to confinement in shelter care facilities. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-60(a)
(1977) (if child is not released, petition shall be filed and hearing held to determine
necessity for continued detention or shelter care); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-103(2)
(1978) (when child is placed in detention or shelter care facility, child's parent or
legal guardian shall be notified of right to hearing to determine need for continued
detention); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-6.5(b) (Burns Supp. 1983) (when child is
alleged to be delinquent, he shall be held in secure facility, unless detention in shelter
care facility is more appropriate); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.44(1) (West Supp. 1983-
1984) (hearing to be held to determine whether child should be placed in detention or
shelter care facility).
17. See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text. During juvenile proceedings,
no trial is held; rather, hearings are utilized to process the juvenile through the justice
system. L. WIES, A GUIDE TO JUVENILE COURT 5 (1977) [hereinafter cited as GUIDE TO
JUVENILE COURT]. In addition to the detention hearing, a hearing on the jurisdic-
tional facts and a hearing regarding the disposition of the case are features of the
juvenile court process. Id. at 21.
The detention hearing is the first hearing to be held and should be commenced
within a reasonable time after the child has been taken into custody. Id. The
detention hearing serves a purpose that is different from the function of the probable
cause hearing. RIGHTS OF JUVENILES, supra note 7, at 3-39. The detention hearing is a
forum for the determination of whether the community interest or the welfare of the
juvenile warrants detention prior to an adjudicatory hearing. Id. The probable cause
hearing establishes whether the particular facts sufficiently indicate that the person
committed the alleged offense. Id. For a list of those states that mandate that a
detention hearing be held when a child is taken into custody, see infra note 75 and
accompanying text.
The hearing on the jurisdictional facts constitutes the proceeding during which the
court will review evidence to decide if the minor has in fact committed the offense as
alleged. GUIDE TO JUVENILE COURT, supra, at 22.
Once the juvenile's involvement in the alleged offense has been established, the
hearing pertaining to the disposition of the case is held. Id. at 23. Usually, this
proceeding is not separate from the hearing on the jurisdictional facts. Id. The issue
to be resolved when the court disposes of the case is whether the juvenile is to be
released or placed in a restrictive environment. Id. at 24.
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quirements underlying court detention procedures often differ, re-
stricting the decision-maker's discretionary power to varying
degrees. '8
This Note addresses constitutional issues relevant to pretrial deten-
tion and identifies problematic aspects in the existing juvenile justice
system. It examines state and model provisions regarding the deten-
tion of youths prior to trial and concentrates on the inclusion of the
detention hearing as an element of detention schemes. This Note
proposes a model state provision that utilizes the detention hearing to
protect the preadjudicatory rights of juveniles and to reduce the risk
that detention will be unnecessarily ordered.' 9
II. Constitutional Implications Regarding Detention and the Legal
Rights of Juveniles
The underpinnings of the current juvenile justice system in the
United States evolved from nineteenth century reform movements
that were directed at the improvement of the status of children who
engaged in or who were likely to engage in deviant behavior. 20 The
reformers' efforts resulted in the establishment of the first juvenile
court in 1899.21 A predominant feature of the reformed system was
18. For example, New Jersey's recently enacted provision dictates that certain
factors be considered during a review of the merits of detention. Factors including
the type and circumstances of the alleged offense and the past attendance record of
the juvenile for court proceedings must be reviewed before a decision concerning the
appropriateness of detention is reached. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-34(e)(I)(5)
(West Supp. 1983-1984). New Jersey's previous governing section, 2A:4-56, did not
require such factors to be taken into consideration. See also DEL. CODE ANN., DEL.
FAM. CT. RULES, R. 60(a) (1981) (during detention hearing, court shall review any
evidence pertinent to possible release of child including any record of child's previous
commission of delinquent acts, child's present home environment, presence of adult
to supervise child, type of offense alleged, protection of community and well-being of
child); W. VA. CODE § 49-5A-2 (1980) (circumstances of particular case are taken
into consideration when determining whether to detain child). The relevant Pennsyl-
vania provision, authorizing informal detention hearings, does not require that such
factors be considered. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN., § 6332(a) (Purdon 1982)
(provision mandates that hearing on matter of continued detention be promptly
held). See id. § 6325 (at informal hearing, it shall be determined whether detention
or shelter care is necessary for protection of person or property of others or of child,
or because child may leave court's jurisdiction, or because no one is available to
supervise and care for him to ensure he returns to court on required date).
19. See infra notes 159-77 and accompanying text.
20. LAW AND TACTICS, supra note 2, at 5. For a description of the change
effectuated by reformers, see infra note 21 and accompanying text.
21. Id. See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967). Pursuant to common law in
the United States, if a child reached the age of criminal responsibility, which was
seven in some states and ten in others, and was alleged to have committed a criminal
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the broad discretionary power granted to decision-makers responsible
for the processing of juvenile cases. This grant of power enabled the
juvenile court process to function in the informal and flexible manner
envisioned by the reformers.2 3 This progress, however, may have been
made at the expense of the juvenile.2 4 Discretionary power that is
unlimited by criteria and procedures poses a risk that juveniles will be
unnecessarily detained. 25 In recent years, the Supreme Court has
act, he would receive the same treatment as an adult wrongdoer; he would be
processed through the same court system as the adult and if he were found to have
committed the particular act, he would be punished. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23
HARV. L. REV. 104, 106 (1909) [hereinafter cited as Mack, The Juvenile Court]. With
the enactment of the first juvenile court statute by Illinois in 1899, reformers began
to change the system that had previously treated juvenile offenders and hardened
criminals alike. Id. at 106-07. Punishment was abandoned as a feature of the system
and was replaced by a process that promoted the treatment and rehabilitation of a
minor who had committed infractions. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 15-16. The proceed-
ings involving juveniles were no longer regarded as criminal, but rather were de-
scribed as civil. Id. at 15-17. In essence, children who had committed offenses were
dealt with as wards of the state rather than as criminals. The juvenile proceeding
became nonadversarial and the juvenile court judge became the representative of
both the child and the state. RIGHTS OF JUVENILES, supra note 7, at 1-2 to 1-3.
The doctrine of parens patriae justified the reformed system's objectives. See 387
U.S. at 15-16; BESHAROV, supra note 2, at 2. Pursuant to this doctrine, the state is
viewed as the guardian of individuals who are legally disabled. BLACK'S LAW DICTIO-
NARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979). In effect, the concept refers to the duty and right of the
state to "protect the young, the helpless, and the incompetent." BESHAROV, supra note
2, at 2 n.5.
22. Hasenfeld, The Juvenile Court Reexamined, supra note 4, at 214 (acting with
such broad discretion, juvenile court judges are able to allow their personal beliefs to
become basis for their decisions). See also BESHAROV, supra note 2, at 11 (discretion
regarding processing of a case is most predominant feature of juvenile justice system);
LAW AND TACTICS, supra note 2, at 15, 18 (wide discretionary power conferred upon
police officers, judges and court personnel must be curtailed). In essence, the doc-
trine of parens patriae enabled a juvenile court judge to deviate from basic legal
principles, and to use the information gathered by specialists such as social workers
and psychiatrists when formulating his decisions. BESHAROV, supra note 2, at 2.
23. See RIGHTS OF JUVENILES, supra note 7, at 1-3.
24. See id. By giving juvenile proceedings an informal and nonadversarial char-
acter, reformers deprived children, subject to court processes, of such due process
protections as an accused person's right to counsel and the right to timely notice of
charges made against him. See Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948), for a discussion
of the due process protection of notice of the specific charge available to accused
persons in the criminal system and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963),
regarding an adult's right to have counsel present at criminal proceedings. The
failure to provide juveniles with such protections was deemed to be justified on the
ground that juvenile proceedings are civil and nonadversarial. RIGHTS OF JUVENILES,
supra note 7, at 1-3 to 1-4.
25. LAW AND TACTICS, supra note 2, at 18. The Supreme Court has warned that
the reforms of the juvenile court system must not be viewed "as an invitation to
procedural arbitrariness." See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966). See
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responded to flaws in the juvenile court system by applying constitu-
tional due process guarantees to juvenile court proceedings. 26 These
decisions have reduced the procedural arbitrariness that accompanied
the earlier reforms. 27 Such determinations, 28 as well as rulings perti-
nent to due process and adult detention, 29 are instructive in ascertain-
ing whether preadjudicatory detention practices are indeed protective
of a juvenile's legal rights.
Detention constitutes an involuntary deprivation of a person's lib-
erty. 30 The fifth and fourteenth amendments prohibit the federal
government and the states from depriving a person of his "life, liberty
or property without due process of law. '3 1 In essence, procedural
also BESHAROV, supra note 2, at 6 (as juvenile court procedure developed, it was not
subjected to legal restrictions; rather, unlimited judicial discretion operated in a
"legal vacuum," creating procedural deprivations).
26. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1975) (in recent decisions Supreme
Court has recognized that realities of juvenile court system do not completely con-
form to system's ideals; thus Court has held that those constitutional guarantees
applied during criminal prosecutions should also be applied during juvenile proceed-
ings). See infra notes 45-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of rights accorded
to juveniles processed through the adjudicatory stage of the juvenile court process.
27. See RIGHTS OF JUVENILES, supra note 7, at 1-4. It has been suggested that the
application of constitutional due process guarantees at juvenile court proceedings
may severely restrict the juvenile court system, which was intended to operate in an
informal and in a flexible manner. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 375-76 (1970)
(Burger, J., dissenting). If juvenile court proceedings are formalized, the juvenile
system may be unable to carry out its beneficent objectives. See id. at 376. Con-
versely, it has been urged that the juvenile process has been able to achieve its
ameliorative goals in spite of the effectuation of procedural reforms. See RIGHTS OF
JUVENILES, supra note 7, at 1-4. To fully ensure that the system functions in the
benevolent and fair manner envisioned by the reformers, the juvenile court process
must provide the child with procedural protections. Id.
.28. See injra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 30-38 and accompanying text. Adults processed through the
criminal court system are viewed differently than are juveniles processsed through
the juvenile justice system. While the adult offender is considered to be "an enemy of
society," the juvenile offender is treated as a child. Whereas the adult must partake
in an adversarial criminal proceeding, the child receives understanding, guidance
and protection. See generally, Hoffman & McCarthy, Juvenile Detention Hearings:
The Case for A Probable Cause Determination, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 267, 279-80
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Hoffman & McCarthy]. See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. at
14 (difference between procedural rights granted to adults and procedural protec-
tions accorded to juveniles has existed since inception of juvenile court system).
30. H. RUBIN, JUVENILE JUSTICE: POLICY, PRACTICE AND LAW 86 (1979) [hereinaf-
ter cited as RUBIN].
31. The fifth amendment provides in part: "No person shall ...be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ...." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
The fourteenth amendment provides that "[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 195 (1968) (quoting due process clauses
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safeguards must accompany such deprivations. 32 Procedural due proc-
ess mandates that when the government impinges upon the life, lib-
erty or property interests of an individual, it must give such person
notice and an opportunity to be heard. 33
Traditionally, the determination of what process must be accorded
individuals before they are deprived of their liberty or property inter-
ests involves consideration of three factors: (1) the private interest to
be affected by the governmental decision; (2) the possibility that the
governmental action, as a result of present procedures, will effect an
erroneous deprivation of the private interest and the value of alternate
or additional safeguards; and (3) the governmental interest to be
affected, including the administrative and fiscal consequences created
through the imposition of the alternate or substitute procedural re-
quirements. 34 This three-factor analysis has been applied in juvenile
detention proceedings. 35
of fifth and fourteenth amendments). See also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574
(1975) (fourteenth amendment's due process clause prohibits "arbitrary deprivations
of liberty").
32. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 502-03 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as TriBE]. Procedural due process guarantees reduce the risk that governmental
action will be erroneously or arbitrarily taken. See id. at 539.
33. TRIBE, supra note 32, at 512.
34. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332, 335 (1976). In Mathews, the
Court, after applying its three-factor analysis, rejected the respondent Eldridge's
claim that the termination of Social Security disability benefit payments could not be
effected without affording the recipient an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 349. See
TRIBE, supra note 32, at 540 (Mathews v. Eldridge test may be viewed as general
formula for ascertaining what process is due when government impinges upon a
private interest).
35. In Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1982), aJJ'ing 513 F. Supp. 691
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), cert. granted sub noma., Schall v. Martin, 103 S. Ct. 1765 (1983)
part of New York's provision for court-ordered detention was held to be unconstitu-
tional. Utilizing the Mathews v. Eldridge approach, Judge Newman, in his concur-
rence, noted that two interests are at stake when New York's detention criterion,
authorizing detention when a serious risk exists that the juvenile will commit a
criminal act, is applied: the private interest of personal liberty and the government
interest in the prevention of crime. Id. at 375-76 (Newman, J., concurring). Under
this three-factor analysis, a significant risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty
exists when detention decisions are based upon predictions about future criminal
activities. Id. at 376. This danger arises because of the uncertainty inherent in a
prediction of future behavior. Restrictions that would reduce the risk of a wrongful
deprivation when the challenged provision is applied are not readily available in the
statutory scheme. Id. at 376-77. For example, the statute does not specify the types of
crimes for which a detainee has been taken into custody that warrant continued
detention. Id. at 377. Furthermore, no probable cause finding regarding the commis-
sion of the underlying crime need be made by the judge who issues the detention
order. Id. In addition, before a judge issues a detention order, he is not required to
consider any aspects of a juvenile's background and is not limited to specific types of
crimes when he predicts the juvenile will commit an offense if released. Id. Judge
1984]
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Due process also mandates that sanctions with a punitive rather
than a regulatory purpose cannot be imposed upon an individual
without affording him certain procedural safeguards. 36 In the context
of pretrial detention, a detainee may not be punished before he has
been found guilty in compliance with due process requisites. 37 Deten-
tion does not, however, constitute punishment merely because the
particular detainee is not free to live as comfortably as he desires while
he is confined. 38
In Gerstein v. Pugh,39 the Supreme Court determined that, in the
context of the criminal justice system, the fourth amendment is rele-
vant to the determination of what process is due when suspects are
detained pending trial.40 According to the Court, the fourth amend-
ment requires that state detention procedures afford a pretrial de-
tainee, following his arrest, a judicial determination of probable cause
prior to the imposition of a significant restraint upon his liberty
Newman also cited the statute's failure to mandate that a particular standard of
proof be met during the detention determination as a ground for his conclusion that
the provision permits a judge unlimited discretion to detain a youth. See id.
36. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 165-66, 186 (1963). if punish-
ment is imposed, the features of a criminal prosecution, including "indictment,
notice, confrontation, jury trial, assistance of counsel, and compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses," must be accorded the person subjected to the punitive measure.
Id. at 167.
The Court in Mendoza-Martinez addressed the question whether automatic for-
feiture-of-citizenship portions of immigration laws constituted punishment or a regu-
latory restraint. Id. at 163-84. Factors deemed important by the Court in this inquiry
included whether the particular sanction has been traditionally viewed as punitive
and whether its "operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retri-
bution and deterrence." Id. at 168 (footnote omitted).
37. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). Thus, to determine whether
conditions and restrictions imposed upon pretrial detainees impermissibly infringe
upon the detainees' liberty interest, it must be asked whether such conditions amount
to punishment. See id. In Bell, the Court concluded that not all of the conditions and
restrictions to which a detainee is subjected constitute punishment "in the constitu-
tional sense." Id. at 537. If the government has legally detained a person, disabilities
may be imposed that are designed to effectuate the detention of this person. Id.
38. Id. at 537. A loss of freedom of choice and privacy is incidental to placement
in a detention facility. Id. In addition, the presumption of innocence accorded to an
individual prior to trial has no significance in determining what rights must be
accorded to a detainee during his confinement prior to trial. Id. at 533.
39. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
40. See id. at 125-26 n.27. The Court noted that the probable cause determina-
tion is the first stage of the criminal justice process set into motion when a person has
been accused of criminal conduct. Id.
The fourth amendment establishes the "right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures" and
dictates that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the placed to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized." U.S CoNsT. amend. IV.
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pending trial. 41 The Gerstein decision has had significant implications
regarding limitations placed upon juvenile detention practices. 42
Lower courts have utilized the decision to delineate the scope of due
process protection that juvenile detainees are entitled to prior to
trial. 43
Although the juvenile system functions in a nonadversarial manner
and represents the state in its role as parens patriae, its procedures
may not be implemented in an arbitrary manner. 44 When a child is
alleged to be delinquent and his case proceeds to the adjudicatory
stage, he must be afforded a proceeding that conforms to the require-
ments of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 45
41. See 420 U.S. at 124-25. According to the Court, the Constitution does not
dictate that adversarial safeguards be provided during the probable cause determina-
tion. Id. at 123. In effect, whether the probable cause determination is an adversarial
proceeding is a matter to be considered by the individual states. Id.
42. See infra notes 96 & 98 and accompanying text.
43. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
44. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554-55 (1966). The Court in Kent
held that a waiver of jurisdiction by a juvenile court pursuant to the District of
Columbia Juvenile Court Act, transferring the juvenile case to an adult court, must
be accompanied by a hearing, access by the juvenile's counsel to the social records
and probation reports considered by the court, and a statement of reasons underlying
the decision to waive jurisdiction. Id. at 560-62. The Court explained that the waiver
hearing need not meet all of the requirements of a criminal trial or an administrative
hearing, but must "measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment."
Id. at 562.
45. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1967). In Gault, the Court reiterated the view
expressed in Kent that delinquency proceedings must comport with " 'the essentials
of due process and fair treatment.' " Id. at 30 (quoting Kent, 383 U.S. at 562). Justice
Harlan, concurring and dissenting in part, formulated the term "fundamental fair-
ness," which has been used by the Court in subsequent decisions as a standard by
which to measure the rights of minors in the context of the juvenile court system. Id.
at 72 (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). See McKeiver v. Pennsylva-
nia, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971) and Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 531 (1975), for
examples of the Court's application of the "fundamental fairness" standard in the
context of the juvenile court system.
The Court in Gault cautioned that its findings did not necessarily apply to preadju-
dicatory or postadjudicatory hearings. 387 U.S. at 13, 31 n.48. State courts, how-
ever, have found that the specific due process guarantees set forth in Gault apply to
juvenile detention hearings. See, e.g., Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47 (Alaska 1971). In
Doe, the court held that at the detention hearing, a court must adhere to due process
standards because, at such a proceeding, the possiblity arises that the child may lose
his liberty. Id. at 53. According to the court, due process requires that the decision to
detain be founded upon "competent, sworn testimony, that the child have the right
to be represented by counsel at the detention inquiry, and that the detention order
state with particularity the facts supporting it." Id. (footnotes omitted). See also T. K.
v. State of Georgia, 126 Ga. App. 269, 274, 190 S.E.2d 588, 592 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972)
(under Georgia Juvenile Court Code, it was intended that procedural requirements
set forth in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) be applied at detention hearing).
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Within the context of such a proceeding, he is entitled to the right to
counsel, 46 the right to notice, 47 the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, 48 and the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. 4 Fur-
thermore, the constitutional standard of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt must be applied during the adjudicatory stage of juvenile pro-
ceedings.50 Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's extension of due
process protections to juveniles at the adjudicatory stage, 5' the Court
has not found that all of the guarantees of the criminal process should
be applied during juvenile court proceedings. 52
III. State and Model Statutory Provisions Relating to Juvenile
Detention
Significant numbers of juveniles are detained each year in both
juvenile facilities53 and in adult jails.5 4 The preadjudicatory system of
46. Id. at 41. If the child's parents are indigent and cannot afford an attorney,
counsel shall be appointed. Id.
47. Id. at 33-34.
48. Id. at 55.
49. See id. at 57.
50. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970). According to the Court, the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment mandates that when a person is charged
with a criminal act, "every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged" must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 364. The Court limited
its holding to the adjudicatory stage of the juvenile court process. Id. at 366-67. See
supra note 31 for text of the due process clause of fourteenth amendment.
51. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
52. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). In McKeiver, the Court
declined to give the juvenile who reaches the adjudicatory stage of juvenile court
proceedings the right to a jury trial. See id. at 545. The Court noted that states
should be allowed to experiment with their juvenile court systems, imposing the
requirement of a jury trial only if desirable. Id at 547.
53. In October 1977, the United States Department of Justice reported that
46,980 juveniles were held in public juvenile detention and correctional facilities in
the United States during the year 1975. Law Enforcement Assistance Admin., CHIL-
DREN IN CUSTODY: ADVANCE REPORT ON THE JUVENILE JUSTICE DETENTION AND FACIL-
ITY CENSUS OF 1975 27, Table 8 [hereinafter cited as CHILDREN IN CUSTODY]. Of the
46,980 juveniles admitted to detention, 7,011 were "held pending court disposition."
Id. at 28-29, Table 9. The Advance Report defines juveniles "held pending court
disposition" as juveniles who have "not had any hearing" or who only have had "a
preliminary screening, detention, or similar hearing and [are] awaiting further court
action." Id. at 12. Juveniles detained in private detention and correctional facilities
numbered 27,290. Id. at 31, Table 11. Five hundred and twenty-nine of the youths
detained in private facilities were "held pending court disposition or awaiting trans-
fer to another jurisdiction." Id. at 33, Table 11. A juvenile who is "awaiting transfer
to another jurisdiction," in the context of the Advance Report, is a detained "juvenile
who allegedly has committed a crime in or run away from another jurisdiction and is
being held pending return to that jurisdiction," including juveniles who have run
away from other correctional facilities, but excluding adjudicated delinquents who
are waiting to be placed in a correctional facility. Id. at 11.
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juvenile detention in the United States has been the subject of criti-
cism. 5 5 Problems within the system include the financial burden
placed upon communities that must fund detention centers, 56 sub-
standard living conditions in facilities where juveniles are held, 57 and
the negative impact that the detention experience has upon the juve-
In 1967, it was reported that statistical findings for the year 1965 resulted in the
conclusion that two-thirds of apprehended youths were placed in detention facilities
for an average stay of twelve days. President's Comm'n on Law Enforcement and
Admin. of Justice, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 37
(Washington, D.C., U.S. Gov't. Printing Ofc., 1967) [hereinafter cited as DELIN-
QUENCY TASK FORCE REPORT].
54. According to statistical findings for the year 1970, approximately 7,798
juveniles are held in jail on a daily basis in the United States. See R. SARt, UNDER
LOCK AND KEY: JUVENILES IN JAILS AND DETENTION 25, Table 2.5 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as UNDER LOCK AND KEY].
Figures regarding juvenile detention in jail facilities during 1970 and data pertain-
ing to juvenile detention in detention facilities during 1971 indicate that approxi-
mately 15,000 juveniles are held in American jails and detention facilities on any
given day. Id. JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 15, at 294.
55. See INTERIM STATUS, supra note 6, at 1; Wald, Pretrial Detention for juve-
niles, in PURSUING JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD 119, 119-20 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1976)
[hereinafter cited as WALD]. Critics have noted that the frequency with which
detention is effected is one of several problems that plagues the juvenile court process.
Id. See generally L. COHEN, PREADJUDICATORY DETENTION IN THREE JUVENILE
COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FACTORS RELATED TO DETENTION OUTCOMES
11 (1975) (a great deal of criticism has been directed at excessive detention practices).
See also Bailey, Preadjudicatory Detention in a Large Metropolitan Juvenile Court, 5
LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 19, 21 (1981) (growing consensus exists that "far too many
children are detained by the court, and largely for wrong reasons"); Corrections,
supra note 7, at 35-36 (practice of detention is misused; judges use detention to delay
action, to punish, to protect, and to find placement for youths when other facilities
are not available); UNDER LOCK AND KEY, supra note 54, at 65 (practice of placing
youths who may be subject to juvenile court proceedings in secure custody is over-
used).
56. INTERIM STATUS, supra note 6, at 1. For data regarding annual expenditures
of public juvenile detention and correctional facilities, see CHILDREN IN CUSTODY,
supra note 53, at 36-37, Table 14; DELINQUENCY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 53,
at 37 (juveniles held in detention facilities for average of twelve days at total cost of
more than fifty-three thousand dollars).
57. INTERIM STATUS, supra note 6, at 1. For an example of substandard condi-
tions in juvenile facilities, see Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 346 F.
Supp. 1354, 1366 (D.R.I. 1972) (court held that while boys confined in "bug-out"
rooms in juvenile training school were theoretically being confined for rehabilitative
purposes, in actuality they were being subjected to punishment). See also UNDER
LOCK AND KEY, supra note 54, at 53-63 (discussion of lack of professionals, services
and programs in detention facilities); See Sarri, Service Technologies: Diversion,
Probation, and Detention in BROUGHT TO JUSTICE? JUVENILES, THE COURTS AND THE
LAW 151, 168-71 (R. Sarri & Y. Hasenfeld eds. 1976) (review of type and extent of
services available to juveniles during detention) [hereinafter cited as Sarri, Service
Technologies].
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nile who is detained.5 8 Criticism has also been directed at state prac-
tices that place juveniles in adult facilities. 59
58. INTERIM STATUS supra note 6, at 1. Pretrial detention may have a detrimental
effect upon the detained child both during and after the detention period. See In re
William M., 3 Cal. 3d 16, 30-31, 473 P.2d 737, 747-48, 89 Cal. Rptr. 33, 43-44
(1970). The following description illustrates the harmful side of temporary confine-
ment:
"It is difficult for an adult who has not been through the experience to
realize the terror that engulfs a youngster the first time he loses his liberty
and has to spend the night or several days or weeks in a cold, impersonal
cell or room away from home or family . . . . The experience tells the
youngster that he is 'no good' and that society has rejected him. So he
responds to society's expectation, sees himself as a delinquent, and acts like
one."
Id. at 31 n.25, 473 P.2d at 747-48 n.25, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 43-44 n.25 (quoting an
amicus's description of detention experience). See also Sarri, Service Technologies,
supra note 57, at 174 (physical environment of most detention facilities tends to
increase negative effects of detention on juveniles); LEGISLATIVE COMM. OF NEW
YORK, FAM. CT. ACT LEG. Rvr. at 3438 (McKinney 1962) (detrimental effect of
detention on child who is needlessly detained may prove to be permanent).
59. See UNDER LOCK AND KEY, supra note 54, at 1-3. Only two states prohibit
such placement under any circumstance. See CONN. GEN STAT. § 46b-131 (1983)
(placement of minor in adult facility is prohibited "except in the case of a mother
nursing her infant"); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6327(c) (Purdon 1982) (persons in
charge of or employed in jail are prohibited from knowingly receiving for detention
or detaining person when reason to believe exists that such person is a child). See also
id. § 6352(b) (once child is found to be delinquent, such child is not to be committed
or transferred to adult penal institution or other facility where adults, convicted of
crimes, serve sentences).
Three jurisdictions make the prohibition absolute when the child being detained is
an alleged delinquent or when a child is detained pending a hearing on the petition
alleging delinquency. See Aiuz. REV STAT. ANN. § 8-226(B) (West Supp. 1974-1983);
MD. CTS. & JUD PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-815(d) (1980 & Supp. 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
14-1-26 (1981).
Thirty-four jurisdictions permit the detention of youths in adult facilities in one or
more of the following circumstances: when a particular juvenile has attained a
specified age; when no other facilities are available; or when the welfare of others in
the juvenile facility warrants such placement. See ALA. CODE § 12-15-61(b)(1) (1977);
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 207(a) (West Supp. 1984); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 19-2-
103(6)(a) (1978 & Supp. 1983); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2313(e) (1981); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 39.032(5)(b) (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-20(a)(4)(A) (Supp.
1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 571-32(f) (Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch 37, 703-6,
§ 3-6(5) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984); IowA CODE ANN. § 232.22(2)(c) (West Supp.
1983-1984); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 208.120 (Bobbs-Merrill 1982); LA. STAT. ANN.,
CODE Juv. PRoc. art. 41(A) (West Spec. Pamphlet 1984); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 37, §
119 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.16(1) (West Supp.
1983-1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.173(1) (West 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
211.151(2) (Vernon 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-306(2)(a), (c) (1983); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 43-212 (1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.170(3) (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
169-B:15 (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-37(c) (West Supp. 1983-1984);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-576(c) (1981 & Supp. 1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-
16(1)(d) (Supp. 1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.312(A) (Page Supp. 1982);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1107.1(B)(3) (West Supp. 1983-1984); OR. REV. STAT, §
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419.575(2)(c),(d) (1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-8-29 (1977); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 37-216(4) (Supp. 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-30(3) (Supp. 1983); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 642(c) (1981); VA. CODE § 16.1-249(B) (Supp. 1983); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 13.04.115 (1962 & Supp. 1983-1984); W. VA. CODE § 49-5-16(a)
(Supp. 1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.209(1),(2) (West 1979 & Supp. 1983-1984);
WYO. STAT. § 14-6-207(c) (1977). Fifteen of the jurisdictions that permit detention in
adult facilities in one or more of the above circumstances allow it only after a court
has ordered such placement. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 207(a) (West Supp.
1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-103(6)(a) (1978 & Supp. 1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
39.032(5) (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-20(a)(4) (1982); HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 571-32(f) (Supp. 1982); LA. STAT. ANN., CODE OF JUv. PRoc. art. 41(A) (West
Spec. Pamphlet 1984); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.16(1) (West Supp. 1983-
1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-306(2)(d) (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:15
(Supp. 1983); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.312(A) (Page Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 26-8-29 (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-216(4) (Supp. 1983); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-3a-30(3) (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 16.1-249(B) (Supp. 1983); W.
VA. CODE § 49-5-16(a) (Supp. 1983). Delaware requires that a court order be issued
to direct the placement of youths in adult facilities, but does not limit such placement
to specific circumstances. See DEL. CODE ANN., DEL FAM CT. RULES, R. 50(b) (1981).
See also N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT. § 304.1(2) (McKinney Pt. 1983) (no child to be detained
in prison, jail, lock-up or other place where adults convicted of or under arrest for
and charged with crime unless state division for youth has approved such placement).
Five states do not expressly proscribe the detention of youths in adult facilities, but
require that separate sections for adults and juveniles be maintained. See ALASKA
STAT. ANN. § 47.10.130 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-819(c)(4) (1981); IND. CODE
ANN. § 31-6-4-6.5 (Burns Supp. 1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3203(7)(A)
(1980 & Supp. 1983-1984); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.12(a) (Vernon 1975 & Supp.
1982-1983). The relevant Mississippi provision contains a proscription against such
placement except when the child is physically segregated from those persons not
within the jurisdiction of the youth court. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-315(2)
(1972). The meaning of the pertinent provision of South Carolina is unclear. It
directs that "[n]o child shall at any time be placed in a jail or other place of detention
for adults, but shall be placed in a room or ward entirely separate from adults." See
S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-21-590(c) (Law. Co-op. 1977).
Provisions that include a general proscription against the placement of juveniles in
adult facilities with an exception under limited circumstances usually require that the
juvenile have no or only incidental contact with adult prisoners, or be kept in
separate quarters. See ALA. CODE § 12-15-61(b)(2)(1977); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 208(a) (West Supp. 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-103(6)(b) (1978 & Supp. 1983);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2313(e) (1981); CA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-20(a)(C) (1982); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 37, 703-6, § 3-6(5) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984); IowA CODE
ANN. § 232.22(2)(c)(4) (West Supp. 1983-1984); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 208.120
(Bobbs-Merrill 1982); LA. STAT. ANN., CODE OF JUV. PROC. art. 41(A) (West Spec.
Pamphlet 1984); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 67 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.16(1) (West Supp. 1983-1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
260.173 (West 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-306(2)(b) (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. §
43-212 (1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.170(3) (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-37(c)
(West Supp. 1983-1984); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-16(1)(d) (Supp. 1983); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2151.312(A) (Page Supp. 1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-216(4) (Supp.
1983); VA. CODE § 16.1-249(B) (Supp. 1983); W. VA. CODE § 49-5-16(a) (Supp.
1983); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.209(1)(b) (West 1979); Wyo. STAT. § 14-6-207(c)
(1977).
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Detention often has serious ramifications for the juvenile regardless
of where he is detained. 0 The experience of pretrial detention raises
even greater concern when it is effected without sufficient evidence to
indicate the involvement of the accused in the alleged crime.6' To
curtail excessive detention practices, new provisions for detention
should limit the discretionary power of decision-makers. 62 Existing
state detention procedures and recommendations made by organiza-
tions that promulgate standards for juvenile court proceedings serve as
guidelines in the formulation of these new provisions. An effort di-
rected at the promulgation of an efficient and fair detention proce-
dure for juveniles should review the following aspects of such provi-
sions: the availability of a detention hearing; 3 the requirement of a
probable cause determination 4 and, if mandated, the stage at which
it is to be made;6 5 the narrowness of criteria for detention;6 6 and the
inclusion of features of accountability. 7
A. The Detention Hearing
The detention of youths during the period between the time at
which they are taken into custody and the time at which the merits of
their cases are ultimately adjudicated is a major cause of overcrowd-
ing in detention facilities.68 The implementation of a statutory man-
60. See UNDER LOCK AND KEY, supra note 54, at 14. In People ex rel. Guggenheim
v. Mucci, the New York Supreme Court observed that pretrial custody has the same
consequence for adults and juveniles: a deprivation of liberty. 77 Misc. 2d 41, 44, 352
N.Y.S.2d 561, 564 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1974), aif'd, 46 A.D.2d 683, 360
N.Y.S.2d 71 (2d Dep't 1974). The court reasoned that, because a loss of liberty is
experienced by juveniles as well as by adults when they are detained prior to trial,
juveniles cannot justifiably be deprived of the rights given to adults at a preliminary
proceeding. Id. at 44-45, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 564-65.
61. Moss v. Weaver, 525 F.2d 1258, 1260 (5th Cir. 1976), ajf'g in part, rev'g in
part 383 F. Supp. 130 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
62. See INTERIM STATUS, supra note 6, at 3; LAW AND TACTICS, supra note 2, at
18.
63. See LAW AND TACTICS, supra note 2, at 184.
64. See id. at 188.
65. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
66. See INTERIM STATUS, supra note 6, at 4.
67. See id.
68. WALD, supra note 55, at 120. See also DELINQUENCY TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 53, at 36 (detention of youths seems "to be far too routinely and frequently
used," both prior to court appearance and while juvenile is awaiting placement in
institution after adjudication).
The IJA-ABA Joint Commission developed standards specifically aimed at the
problem of excessive detention practices. These guidelines substantially limit the
discretion of decision-makers during the detention process. According to the Com-
mission, the danger of over-detention prior to trial or disposition should cause greater
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date which requires that a detention hearing be held whenever a
juvenile is not released within a specified period of time is one alterna-
tive to rectify excessive detention practices.69
This practice may ensure that detention decisions made by police
and intake workers at early stages in the juvenile justice process will
be judicially reviewed. 70 Such a procedure will encourage these deci-
sion-makers to consider alternatives for dealing with an alleged juve-
nile delinquent other than automatic detention.7' Thus, the unneces-
sary detention of youths would be avoided at the onset of the juvenile
justice process.7 2 When a jurisdiction gives detained juveniles a statu-
tory right to a detention hearing, a juvenile who is denied a prompt
detention hearing has a basis upon which to challenge his continued
detention. r
Detention hearings are authorized by statute or court rules in most
jurisdictions.7 4 Thirty-six states and the District of Columbia require
alarm than the risk that juveniles will be erroneously released. INTERIM STATUS, supra
note 6, at 3.
In 1967, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice addressed the problem of over-detention and recommended that limitations
be placed upon those individuals vested with the authority to order the detention of a
youth. The Commission also suggested that alternatives be made available to police
officers and workers who, when confronted with runaways or allegedly delinquent
juveniles during the night, have no choice other than to detain the youths until a
proper inquiry can be made. DELINQUENCY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 53, at 37.
69. See DELINQUENCY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 53, at 37; TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 8, at 401-02. But cf. WALD, supra note 55, at 121 (concrete
evidence indicating that detention hearing significantly reduces over-detention is
virtually non-existent).
70. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 401-02. It has been held that when a
juvenile is statutorily entitled to a detention hearing, he must be accorded such a
proceeding. See In re Colar, 9 Cal. App. 3d 613, 617, 88 Cal. Rptr. 651, 653 (Ct.
App. 1970). The juvenile's right to a jurisdictional hearing at a future date does not
relieve the court of its responsibility to give the juvenile the more immediate deten-
tion hearing. Id. See also T.K. v. State, 126 Ga. App. 269, 273, 190 S.E.2d 588, 591-
92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972) (court determined detention hearing has purpose that paral-
lels function of commitment hearing in criminal system; committing court
determines if adequate grounds exist to support guilt of accused individual and "to
require him to appear and answer before the court competent to try him.
71. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 401-02.
72. See id. By screening decisions to detain at detention hearings, excessive
detention practices are eliminated because pretrial detention becomes the exception
rather than the rule. See In re William M., 3 Cal. 3d 16, 25-26, 473 P.2d 737, 743-
44, 89 Cal. Rptr. 33, 39-40 (1970).
73. LAW AND TACTICS, supra note 2, at 184.
74. See infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text. Drafters of model juvenile
provisions advocate a prompt judicial review of the merits of the continued detention
of juveniles. As early as 1958, the National Conference of Commissioners recom-
mended a provision which mandated that an informal detention hearing be held
within seventy-two hours of the placement of a child in detention if he has not
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that a hearing be held on the matter of detention if a child is not
released within a specified period.75 North Carolina requires that a
hearing to determine the need for continued detention or a hearing on
the merits be held within five days of the taking of the child into
custody.76 Some of the jurisdictions that require such a hearing be held
authorize informal proceedings. 77 Other states may be categorized as
jurisdictions that give a statutory right to a detention hearing. They
establish this right by either implying that it may be waived or by
already been released. NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM
JUVENILE COURT ACT 259, § 17 (1958) [hereinafter cited as UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT
ACT]. In 1976, the National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and
Goals proposed that a juvenile who is not released within forty-eight hours of having
been taken into custody should be afforded a judicial hearing to consider the question
of continued detention. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, Standard 12.11, at
401. The IJA-ABA Joint Commission on Juvenile Justice Standards recommended
that a "release hearing" be held by a court within twenty-four hours of the filing of a
petition for such a hearing. See INTERIM STATUS, supra note 6, Standard 7.6(A), at
85. This petition must be filed within twenty-four hours of a child's admittance to an
intake facility, resulting in a maximum forty-eight hour period of detention prior to
the detention hearing. See id., Standard 6.5(D)(2), at 76. In its recent report, the
National Advisory Committee for Juvenile Justice recommended that the juvenile be
given a detention hearing within twenty-four hours of his being taken into custody.
See JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 15, Standard 3_.1.55, at 303.
75. See ALA. CODE § 12-15-60(a) (1977); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.140(c) (1979);
AmRz. REV. STAT. ANN., JUv. CT. RULES OF PRoc., R. 3 (Supp. 1983-1984); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 45-421(a) (Supp. 1983); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 632 (West Supp. 1984);
DEL. CODE ANN., DEL. FAM. CT. RULES, R. 60(a) (1981); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-
2312(a)(1) (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.032(2)(f)(7) (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE
ANN. § 15-11-21(c) (1982); IDAHO CODE, JUv. CT. RULES, R. 17(b) (1982); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 37, 703-5, § 3-5(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-
6-4-5(f) (Burns Supp. 1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.44(1) (West Supp. 1983-1984);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 208.192 (Bobbs-Merrill 1982) (this section was repealed in
1982; repeal is effective July 15, 1984); LA. STAT. ANN., CODE JUV. PROC. art. 38
(West Spec. Pamphlet 1984); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-815(c) (Supp.
1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 15, § 3203(2) (1980 & Supp. 1982-1983); MICH.
ComP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.14 (West 1968 & Supp. 1983-1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
260.172(1) (West 1982); Mo. RULES OF CT., JUv. CT. RULES, R. 111.07(a) (West
1984); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-38(a) (West Supp. 1983-1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
32-1-26(A)(2) (1981); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 320.2, 320.4(2) (McKinney Pt. 2 1983);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-17 (1974); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.314 (Page 1976);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10., § 1107 (West Supp. 1982-1983); OR. REV. STAT. §
419.577(3) (1981); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6332(a) (Purdon 1982); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 20-7-600(d) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-217(b)(1)
(Supp. 1983); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.01(a) (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1982-1983);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 643(a) (1981); VA. CODE § 16.1-250(A) (1982); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 13.40.050(1)(b) (Supp. 1983-1984); W. VA. CODE § 49-5-8(a) (Supp.
1982); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48.21(1)(a) (West 1979 & Supp. 1983-1984); Wyo. STAT. §
14-6-209(a) (1978).
76. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-577 (1981).
77. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-17(2)(1974) (if child is not released,
petition shall be filed and informal detention hearing shall be held promptly); OHIo
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specifying that the juvenile is entitled to a hearing only upon re-
quest.7 8
The inclusion of a time period within which the detention hearing
must be held reduces the number of delays that characterize the
juvenile court system.79 Delays are problematic for both the juvenile
and the community. 0 Current provisions that require a detention
hearing 8' vary regarding the time period within which the hearing
must be held. 82 Eleven jurisdictions require that the matter of a
youth's continued detention be reviewed within seventy-two hours of
the juvenile's admittance to detention. 83 Nine states mandate that the
REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.314 (Page 1976) (if child is not released from detention,
complaint shall be filed and informal detention hearing shall be held promptly).
78. See Note, A Due Process Dilemma: Pretrial Detention in Juvenile Delin-
quency Proceedings, 11 J. MAR. J. PRAc. & PROC. 513, 525 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Due Process Dilemma]. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-815b(a), (e) (1981)
(child who is detained is entitled to detention hearing unless right to such hearing is
waived); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-205.04 (1978) (probable cause hearing may be re-
quested after detention order is entered; however, court may at its option hold
adjudicatory hearing as soon as possible); NEV. REV STAT. § 62.170(4) (1983) (child
who is taken into custody, upon application, must be given detention hearing); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-8-19.2 (Supp. 1983) (child placed in detention or shelter
care has right to prompt hearing to determine if he is to be detained further).
New Hampshire neither mandates that a detention hearing be held nor establishes
a right to such a procedure upon request. Instead, its relevant provision requires that
the court order detention until the child is arraigned. Such an arraignment must be
held within twenty-four hours of the child's having been taken into custody. See
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:13 (Supp. 1983). Similarly, Rhode Island has no
provision for a detention hearing, but requires that the child be granted a probable
cause hearing within ten days of the filing of the petition. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-
11 (1982).
79. INTERIM STATUS, supra note 6, at 14.
80. Id. at 11. For example, the juvenile may fail to appear before the court or
may engage in antisocial conduct when released. Id. To reduce delays in the pretrial
stage, states that have detention hearing provisions have limited the time period
between the initial custodial taking of the child and the detention hearing. Id.
81. See supra note 75 and accompanying text for a list of those jurisdictions that
require a detention hearing be held within a certain period of time after a child is
taken into custody.
82. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text for categorizations of the
various provisions.
83. ALA. CODE § 12-15-60(a) (1977) (including Saturdays, Sundays and holidays);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-421(a) (Supp. 1983) (if 72 hour period ends on Saturday,
Sunday or holiday, hearing shall be held on next business day following such 72 hour
period); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-21(c) (1982) (excluding Saturdays, Sundays and
holidays); Ky REV. STAT. ANN. § 208.192(2) (Bobbs-Merrill 1982) (excluding Sundays
and holidays); LA. STAT. ANN., CODE JUV. PROC. art. 38 (West Spec. Pamphlet 1983);
Mo. RULES OF COURT, JUV. CT. RULES, R. 111.07(b) (West 1984) (excluding Satur-
days, Sundays and holidays); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.172(1) (West 1982) (excluding
Saturdays, Sundays and holidays); Oro REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.314 (Page 1976); 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6332(a) (Purdon 1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-217(b)(1)
(Supp. 1983) (excluding nonjudicial days); Wyo. STAT. § 14-6-209(a) (1978).
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detention hearing be held within forty-eight hours of the time that the
juvenile was initially taken into custody. 84 Seven states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia either require that the detention hearing be held
within twenty-four hours of the onset of detention or specify that the
detention hearing must begin on the next judicial day. 85 Three states
with mandatory detention hearing provisions establish time limita-
tions that begin running when a petition for delinquency is filed.86
The relevant New Jersey provision contains features that conceivably
84. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.140(c) (1979); CAL. WELF & INST. CODE § 632
(West Supp. 1984) (within forty-eight hours or before expiration of next judicial day,
whichever is later); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-5(f) (excluding Saturdays, Sundays and
holidays) (Burns Supp. 1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.44(1) (West Supp. 1983-1984)
(excluding Saturdays, Sundays and holidays); ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 15, § 3203(2)
(1980 & Supp. 1983-1984) (within forty-eight hours of placement or within twenty-
four hours following Saturdays, Sundays and holidays that occur after initial deten-
tion); OR. REV. STAT. § 419.577(3) (1981) (excluding Saturdays, Sundays and holi-
days); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-600(d) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983) (excluding Sundays
and holidays); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.01(a) (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1982-1983)
(not later than second working day after child taken into custody; if initially detained
on Friday or Saturday, not later than first working day after admittance to custody);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 643(a) (1981) (within forty-eight hours of filing of order of
court).
85. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2312(a)(1) (1981) (excluding Sundays); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 39.032(2)(f) (excluding Sundays and holidays); IDAHO CODE § 16-1811(2)
(Supp. 1983) (excluding Saturdays, Sundays and holidays); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 3-815(c) (1980 & Supp. 1983) (not later than next court day); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1107(C) (West Supp. 1983-1984) (not beyond next judicial day);
VA. CODE § 16-1.250(A) (1982) (on next court day, but if court not in session, within
seventy-two hours); W. VA. CODE § 49-5-8(a) (Supp. 1982) (not to exceed next
succeeding judicial day, excluding Saturdays); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.21(1)(a) (West
1979 & Supp. 1983-1984) (excluding Saturdays, Sundays and holidays). Illinois re-
quires that a hearing be held within thirty-six hours of the initial confinement. See
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, 703-5, § 3-5(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-1983). North
Dakota permits the detention hearing to be held within four days of the beginning of
detention. See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 27-20-17 (1974). Delaware and Michigan do
not specify the time period during which the child must be accorded a hearing. See
DEL. CODE ANN., DEL. FAM. CT. RULES, R. 60(a) (1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
712A.14 (1968 & Supp. 1983-1984) (if child is not released, "preliminary hearing on
status" is to be held).
86. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN., Juv. CT. RULES OF PRoc., R. 3(d) (West Supp.
1983-1984) (petition to be filed within twenty-four hours of beginning of detention,
excluding Saturdays, Sundays and holidays; detention hearing to be held within
twenty-four hours of filing of petition, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and holidays);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-26(A)(2) (1981) (petition to be filed within forty-eight hours
of beginning of detention, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and holidays; within
twenty-four hours of filing of petition, detention hearing to be held, not including
Saturdays, Sundays and holidays); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.050(1)(b) (Supp.
1983-1984) (petition, information to be filed within seventy-two hours of onset of
detention, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and holidays; hearing to be held within
seventy-two hours of such filing, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and holidays).
The applicability of the alternate provisions included in New York's Family Court
Act depends upon whether the child was taken into custody before or after the filing
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reduce delays more effectively than any other provision that mandates
a detention hearing be held. 87
Most of the provisions setting forth time constraints exclude week-
ends and legal holidays from the calculation of the time period. 88 Two
states expressly include weekends and holidays in the limited time
frame.8 9
Two types of interests should be considered by drafters of a deten-
tion hearing provision that imposes a time restriction. First, the family
court prosecutor must be given an adequate period of time to organize
evidence and to interview witnesses in preparation for the detention
hearing. Second, the impact that the detention experience will have
upon the youth must be considered, particularly because the detention
of the child may be unnecessary.90 A twenty-four hour mandate that
includes holidays and weekends is burdensome to court personnel such
as the prosecutor, but is preferable to longer time allowances. It
protects the child from the negative effects of detention and eliminates
delays in the juvenile court system, reducing both the over-detention
that characterizes juvenile judicial processes and the cost to taxpayers
that is incurred when youths are detained.91 Neither the juvenile nor
his parents should have to request that the child be granted a deten-
tion hearing; rather, the judicial review concerning the question of
the continued detention of a child should be automatic. 92 Further-
more, this mandatory review of an initial decision to detain a youth
should be conducted in the presence of the juvenile's counsel.9 3
of a petition alleging delinquent conduct. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 320.2(1), 307.4
(McKinney Pt. 2 1983).
87. First, the New Jersey provision mandates that the detention hearing be held
no later than the morning after the juvenile has been admitted into detention. See
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-38(e) (West Supp. 1983-1984). Second, the length of any
period of unnecessary detention is reduced through the inclusion of weekends and
holidays in the calculation of the time period allotted for the detention hearing. See
id.
88. See supra notes 83-87.
89. See ALA. CODE § 12-15-60(a) (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-38(e) (West
Supp. 1983-1984).
90. JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 15, at 303-04.
91. Id. at 304. See also INTERIM STATUS, supra note 6, at 11 (delay in juvenile
court system "increases the risks of nonappearance and antisocial conduct" on part of
juvenile if he is released).
92. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 401-02.
93. WALD, supra note 55, at 121. See also TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at
402 ("[t]he informed participation of counsel is essential to a full and fair hearing"; a
juvenile should be accorded due process protections at detention hearing, including
right to counsel).
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B. The Probable Cause Standard
The unnecessary detention of juveniles can be avoided through the
institution of a probable cause standard of review at the detention
hearing.9 4 An inquiry that asks whether probable cause exists to be-
lieve that the juvenile has committed the act for which he has been
detained adds specificity to the decisional process and reduces the
number of detention orders.15
In Gerstein v. Pugh, the Supreme Court concluded that a judicial
determination of probable cause must precede an "extended restraint
of liberty following arrest."9 The Court has not directly defined the
role of a probable cause inquiry in the context of pretrial juvenile
detention.9 7 Lower courts, however, have utilized the Gerstein hold-
ing to support the view that the fourth amendment's probable cause
standard is applicable when a juvenile is taken into custody. 8 The
Eighth Circuit recently held that juveniles who are accused of com-
94. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 402. See also Sosin & Sarri, Due
Process-Reality or Myth? in BROUGHT TO JUSTICE? JUVENILES, THE COURTS, AND THE
LAW 176, 190 (R. Sarri & Y. Hasenfeld eds. 1976) (probable cause determination
should be strong factor in detention decision-making process).
95. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 402 (this inquiry constitutes judicial
screening of sufficiency of allegations directed at particular juvenile).
96. 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975). Although the Court concluded that the probable
cause determination must be made either before or immediately after the arrest of an
individual, id. at 125, it declined to identify the exact pretrial stage during which
probable cause must be established. Id. at 123-24 (specific procedures surrounding
probable cause determination should be formulated by the particular states).
97. LAW AND TACTICS, supra note 2, at 187.
98. The following decisions represent the view that a prompt determination of
probable cause should be afforded to juveniles who are facing prehearing confine-
ment: Moss v. Weaver, 525 F.2d 1258, 1260 (5th Cir. 1976), aff'g in part, rev'g in
part 383 F. Supp. 130 (S.D. Fla. 1974); Cox v. Turley, 506 F.2d 1347, 1353 (6th Cir.
1974); Cooley v. Stone, 414 F.2d 1213, 1213-14 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Black Bonnet v.
South Dakota, 357 F. Supp. 889, 890 (D.S.D. 1973); Baldwin v. Lewis, 300 F. Supp.
1220, 1230 (E.D. Wis. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 442 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1971); In
re Joshua, 327 So.2d 429, 429-30 (La. Ct. App. 1976); People ex rel. Guggenheim v.
Mucci, 32 N.Y.2d 307, 312-13, 298 N.E.2d 109, 112, 344 N.Y.S.2d 944, 948 (1973);
In re Roberts, 290 Or. 441, 447, 622 P.2d 1094, 1097 (Or. 1981) (en banc).
The Fifth Circuit in Moss v. Weaver held that in view of the conclusions reached in
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), Florida's pretrial detention practices failed to
pass constitutional muster because of the lack of a probable cause requirement. 525
F.2d at 1260. The court rejected an attempt to distinguish Gerstein on the ground
that the more flexible standard of fundamental fairness is applicable in the juvenile
court system. The court reasoned that the fourth amendment's probable cause re-
quirement must riot be set aside on the ground that a juvenile "pre-detention hear-
ing" is not a formal stage in the criminal justice system. Id. In fact, it has aspects
similar to features of the criminal process. Id. The court limited its holding, in
accordance with Gerstein, concluding that a probable cause determination has a low
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mitting criminal acts, as well as juveniles who have been detained for
committing "status offenses, ' must be afforded prompt probable
cause hearings to the same extent as juveniles who are accused of
committing criminal offenses. 00 In Brown v. Fauntleroy, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that
a probable cause inquiry must be made even when detention has not
been ordered; the court struck down a lower court's denial of a
request for a probable cause hearing in the case of a juvenile who was
arrested for the unauthorized use of a vehicle, but who was not
detained. 10'
Unlike the court in Brown, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals rejected the proposition that a constitutional right to a proba-
ble cause hearing exists even when a minor is not held in detention. 102
standard of proof and therefore, adversary safeguards are not required. Id. at 1260-
61.
The traditional parens patriae philosophy underlying the juvenile court system was
also rejected by an Arizona state court as a ground for denying a juvenile a hearing.
See Bell v. Superior Court, County of Pima, 117 Ariz. 551, 554, 574 P.2d 39, 42 (Ct.
App. 1977). Although the court in Bell found that the fourth amendment does not
dictate that adversary safeguards be provided, it concluded that before a juvenile
may be detained, pending an adjudicatory hearing, it must be judicially determined
that probable cause to believe that the juvenile has acted in a delinquent manner
exists. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that a hearing is not
required in every case. Id. For a description of the parens patriae doctrine, see supra
note 21 and accompanying text.
99. A status offense is an act that is deemed to be illegal only when a minor
engages in such behavior. If an adult commits a status offense, no court sanction is
imposed. RUBIN, supra note 30, at 34. Examples of status offenses include acts such as
truancy and a child's running away from home. Such conduct does not pose an
imminent threat to society. R.W.T. v. Dalton, 712 F.2d 1225, 1231 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983).
100. See 712 F.2d at 1231. The court of appeals in Dalton concluded that a
requirement which provides that probable cause hearings be granted to detained
juveniles does not preclude juvenile courts from fulfilling their special function in the
juvenile justice system. Id. at 1230. The right to a probable cause determination is a
basic due process right, according to the court. Id. at 1230-31.
101. See Brown v. Fauntleroy, 442 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In Brown, the
court reasoned that a juvenile who is taken into custody is entitled to the protection of
the fourth amendment's probable cause requirement. Id. at 841-42.
102. See M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 313 (D.C. Ct. App. 1981). The court in
M.A.P. concluded that, pursuant to the District of Columbia Court Reform and
Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, it was no longer required to follow the decisions of
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rendered
after the Act's effective date. Id. at 312. This enactment established the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals as the highest court in the District's judicial system and
eliminated the authority of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit to review the decisions of the former court. Id. Because of the
legislators' inclusion of other precautionary features in the District of Columbia's
juvenile procedural provision, which preclude the institution of meritless claims
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The court determined that when a juvenile is not detained prior to
trial, the failure to provide him with a probable cause hearing is not
violative of the standard of fundamental fairness. 103 Similarly, relying
on the doctrine of parens patriae,10 4 a Rhode Island court held that a
child who is at risk of being detained prior to trial is not entitled to a
probable cause hearing.10 5
Those courts which have determined that juvenile justice proce-
dures must be supplemented by a judicial finding of probable cause
regarding the commission of an alleged offense generally do not spe-
cifically mandate that probable cause be established at the detention
hearing. 106 To discourage the effectuation of baseless detention deci-
sions at an early stage in the juvenile court process, such a screening
should be made at the detention hearing.10 7
Among those jurisdictions that require the holding of a detention
hearing for a detained juvenile, twelve states and the District of
Columbia require that probable cause regarding the alleged offense be
established at the hearing in addition to showing that criteria such as a
risk of harm to the community or to the juvenile apply.10 8 The provi-
against a juvenile, the court in M.A.P. reasoned that a probable cause hearing was
not constitutionally necessary. Id. at 316-17.
103. Id. at 317.
104. See supra note 21 and accompanying text for a definition of parens patriae
and a description of the doctrine's significance to the juvenile court system.
105. See Morris v. D'Amario, 416 A.2d 137, 142 (R.I. Sup. Ct. 1980). The filing of
a formal petition, followed by the issuance of an order by a family court justice was
held to be sufficient in the detention of a child pending final adjudication. Id.
106. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. But see, Baldwin v. Lewis, 300 F.
Supp. 1220, 1232, (E.D. Wis. 1969), rev'd on other grouhds, 442 F.2d 29 (7th Cir.
1971) (court determined that probable cause finding must be made at detention
hearing). See also People ex rel. Mucci, 32 N.Y.2d 307, 313, 298 N.E.2d 109, 112,
344 N.Y.S.2d 944, 948-49 (1973) (court noted detention hearing may be appropriate
stage to make probable cause determination).
107. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 401-02. The detention hearing in
the juvenile court system parallels the adult preliminary hearing in the criminal
system insofar as its purpose is concerned. Hoffman & McCarthy, supra note 29, at
297. Both hearings examine the possibility of continuing proceedings against a partic-
ular individual. Id. See also, RUBIN, supra note 30, at 102-03 (in adult criminal
system, probable cause hearings are held to determine whether sufficient grounds
exist to believe defendant has committed a particular act; if such finding is not made,
defendant is released). When juveniles do not have a right to be released on bail or on
their own recognizance, the evidentiary standard utilized at a detention hearing
should entail a finding of probable cause to believe that an offense has been commit-
ted and that the particular juvenile participated in the alleged act. Hoffman &
McCarthy, supra note 29, at 297.
108. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.140(d) (1979); Asuz. REv. STAT. ANN., JUv. CT.
RULES OF PROC., R. 3(b), (f) (Supp. 1983-1984); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2312(f) (1981);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.032(7) (West Supp. 1983); INn. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-5(g)
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sions setting forth this requirement take a variety of forms. 109 Some
provisions implicitly require that a nexus between an allegation of
misconduct and a finding of probable cause be established." 0 Some-
times the particular statute sets forth the probable cause requirement
in terms of a mandatory provision for release."' Some states do not
require that a probable cause determination be made at the manda-
tory detention hearing, but give the detained youth the right to a
probable cause finding within a specified time period."
2
(Burns Supp. 1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.44(5)(a) (West Supp. 1983-1984); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 208.192(4)(a) (Bobbs-Merrill 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 3203(5)(D) (1980 & Supp. 1983-1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1107(c) (West
Supp. 1983-1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 419.577(3) (1981); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
6332(a) (Purdon 1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-214(a) (Supp. 1983); Wis. STAT.
ANN. §§ 48.208(1), 48.21(1)(a) (West 1979 & Supp. 1983-1984).
109. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2312(f) (1981) ("[w]hen a judge finds there is
probable cause to believe the allegations in the petition are true, he shall order the
child to be placed or continued in detention or shelter care . . ."); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 6332(a) (Purdon 1982) (if child is alleged to be delinquent, court or
master will determine if probable cause exists); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.208(1) (West
1979 & Supp. 1983-1984) (child may be held in secure detention facility if intake
worker determines that probable cause exists to believe child has committed delin-
quent act). Section 48.21 of the Wisconsin statute requires that a judge or court
commissioner make the above finding at a hearing for continued custody.
110. For example, Iowa's provision requires a showing oi probable cause that the
child is within the court's jurisdiction prior to the making of a decision to detain. See
IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.44(5)(a) (West Supp. 1983-1984) ("[t]he court [at the deten-
tion hearing] shall find release to be proper . . . [i]f the court finds that there is not
probable cause to believe that the child is a child within the jurisdiction of the court
' . . "). Thus in Iowa, when a child is alleged to have committed a delinquent act, he
necessarily is within the court's jurisdiction and probable cause of the commission of
such act must be ascertained. See also, OR. REV. STAT. § 419.577(3) (1981) (finding of
probable cause as to court's jurisdiction is required).
111. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-421(e)(1) (Supp. 1983) The subsection pro-
vides in part: "[t]he court shall find release to be proper under the following circum-
stances:
1. That there is no probable cause to believe that the juvenile is within the
jurisdiction of the court."
112. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-38(i) (West Supp. 1983-1984) ("[t]here
shall be a probable cause determination where a juvenile has been charged with
delinquency and has been placed in detention, within 2 court days after the initial
[detention] hearing"); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 325.1(1) (McKinney Pt. 2 1983) (at
initial appearance, if respondent denies charge contained in petition and court
determines that he shall be detained for more than three days pending fact-finding
hearing, court shall schedule probable cause hearing).
In United States ex rel. Martin v. Strasburg, 513 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
aff'd, 689 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted sub nvm. Schall v. Martin, 103 S.
Ct. 1765 (1983), the district court deemed New York's preventive detention provision
for juveniles to be unconstitutional on the ground that the provision authorized
detention without a showing of probable cause. The provision, section 739(a)(ii) of
the New York Family Court Act, has been recodified as section 320.5(3)(b). The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's holding on the
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Three organizations that have promulgated juvenile justice stan-
dards have suggested that an evidentiary standard of probable cause
be incorporated into pretrial detention procedures."13 Moreover, these
organizations suggest that the probable cause determination be made
at the detention hearing itself.1 4 The probable cause determination
should be made when the detention hearing begins. "15 Through such a
procedure, prejudice to the juvenile can be significantly reduced be-
cause the court will review the sufficiency of evidence supporting
allegations against the juvenile prior to a consideration of his past
record. 116
C. Detention Criteria and Accountability Safeguards
Through an application of specific criteria setting forth grounds for
detaining youths, unnecessary occurrences of detention can be
avoided." 7 Over-detention in the juvenile court system can also be
curtailed if accountability within the system is increased." 8 By hold-
ground that the statutory scheme essentially authorized punishment prior to an
adjudication of guilt. Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365, 366 (2d Cir. 1982). The
court did not address the lack of a probable cause requirement in the provision. In his
concurring opinion, Judge Newman specifically objected to the statute's authoriza-
tion of pretrial detention without a probable cause determination. Id. at 377 (New-
man, J., concurring). According to Judge Newman, the New York preventive deten-
tion scheme poses a risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty without a limitation
such as a probable cause requirement. Id. For a discussion of the main points of
Judge Newman's concurrence, see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
In April, 1983, the United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction over
the Martin case. See 103 S. Ct. 1765 (1983). Oral arguments were presented on
January 17, 1984.
113. See JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 15, Standard 3.155, at 303; TASK
FOnCE REPORT, supra note 8, Standard 12.11, at 401; INTERIM STATUS, supra note 6,
Standard 7.6, at 85.
114. SeeJUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 15, Standard 3.155, at 303; TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, Standard 12.11, at 401; INTERIM STATUS, supra note 6,
Standard 7.6, at 85.
115. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, commentary to Standard 12.11, at 402.
Commenting on the probable cause requirement incorporated in Standard 12.11's
detention hearing provision, the National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals advised: "The probable cause issue should be heard at the
beginning of the detention hearing so that prejudicial information regarding the
juvenile's social and court history will not be introduced before the judge decides
whether the charges are sound." Id.
116. Alaska makes the probable cause determination a preliminary inquiry at the
detention hearing. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.140(d) (1979). The subsection provides
in part: "If the court finds that probable cause exists, it shall determine whether the
minor should be detained pending the hearing on the petition or released." Id.
117. See INTERIM STATUS, supra note 6, at 5-11.
118. INTERIM STATUS, supra note 6, at 14; Sarri, Service Technologies, supra note
57, at 174.
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ing the juvenile court judge accountable for a decision to detain,
responsible decision-making is more likely to occur.1"" The require-
ment that a written statement of facts and reasons supporting such a
decision be made both increases accountability and reduces the possi-
bility of discretionary abuses during the decision-making process. 120
The broad discretion originally vested in juvenile courts enabled
them to further goals of the state in its role as parens patriae.12 The
unnecessary use of detention is a product of this broad power.
Through the incorporation of restrictive detention criteria in deten-
tion provisions, better-informed and more accountable systems of
pretrial detention can be established. 122 Criteria for detention should
be specific and delineate particular circumstances that warrant the
detention of a child.1 23 Open-ended standards should be avoided be-
cause they enable a judge to use subjective judgments in reaching a
decision to detain.1 24
119. UNDER LOCK AND KEY, supra note 54, at 68.
120. See INTERIM STATUS, supra note 6, at 14. See supra notes 21-24 and accompa-
nying text regarding the risk, arising from the nonadversary character of the juvenile
justice system, that decision-makers will act with unlimited discretion.
Another way to promote accountability within the juvenile court system is to
require that weekly reports listing juvenile detainees and the length and basis for
their detention be prepared and submitted to the court for review. Such reports,
without the names of the detainees, should also be publicly issued. INTERIM STATUS,
supra note 6, at 14.
121. See supra note 21 and accompanying text for a discussion regarding the
significance of the parens patriae doctrine.
122. INTEMM STATUS, supra note 6, at 5. The IJA-ABA Joint Commission noted in
its introductory comments that the Commission's detention standards differ from the
criteria of previous model codes which conferred broad powers of discretion upon
decision-makers. Id. at 5. See also WALD, supra note 55, at 121 (detention criteria are
critical features of any detention hearing).
123. See generally, INTEMM STATUS, supra note 6, at 5-11. Authorities arrive at
virtually the same categories when they categorize those juveniles who should be
detained prior to trial and agree that juveniles may be detained prior to trial when
they fall within one of the following three groups: (1) juveniles "who may abscond
before a court hearing"; (2) juveniles "who are almost certain to commit a dangerous
offense before court disposition"; and (3) juveniles "who must be held for another
jurisdiction." UNDER LOCK AND KEY, supra note 54, at 37. The placement of a
juvenile in a detention unit on the ground that the juvenile must be protected from
himself has been described as "inappropriate" in light of the conditions that often
exist in such facilities. A child who is "self-destructive" should not be placed in a
detention facility, but rather, should be referred to a hospital or to an emergency
clinic. Id.
One organization that has promulgated juvenile justice standards has advised that
a court should not detain a juvenile solely on the ground that the child may commit a
property offense. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 391. For a list of those
jurisdictions in the United States that include the possible commission of a property
offense as a basis for detention, see infra note 138 and accompanying text.
124. See WALD, supra note 55, at 121-22.
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Statutory criteria adopted by state legislatures are rarely more spe-
cific than the standards set forth in model codes. 125 The predominant
criteria appearing in provisions for court-ordered detention include
the necessity to protect the person and property of others, the need to
protect the child's welfare, the risk that the child will not appear at
future court proceedings, and the lack of a parent or guardian to care
for the child. 126
125. INTERIM STATUS, supra note 6, at 7.
126. See infra notes 127-139 and accompanying text for a discussion of these types
of criteria. This Note deals primarily with preventive types of criteria applied to
ensure appearance at court proceedings and to protect the child and general public
from bodily harm.
Recommendations pertaining to detention criteria may be found in the following
standards drafted by standards-recommending organizations: TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 8, Standard 12.7, at 390; JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 15,
Standard 3.152, at 297; INTERIM STATUS, supra note 6, Standard 6.6, at 78. Standard
12.11 of the TASK FORCE REPORT provides that, at the detention hearing, the prosecu-
tion must establish that, after an application of appropriate detention criteria, the
need for detention of the juvenile is evident. Thus, the criteria included in Standard
12.7 are to be employed at the detention hearing. Standard 3.152 of the Juvenile
Justice Standards includes a consideration of factors in the juvenile's past such as a
"demonstrable recent record of violent conduct resulting in physical injury to oth-
ers." The commentary supplementary to this standard explains that the term "de-
monstrable record" would not necessitate the submission of a certified copy of a prior
adjudication order. See JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 15, at 297. Mere
allegations regarding the past behavior of the juvenile, however, should not be
sufficient to support a detention decision. See id. The IJA-ABA Joint Commission
does not specifically suggest in its detention hearing provision that the court follow
the guidelines of Standard 6.6. See INTERIM STATUS, supra note 6, Standard 7.6, at
85. The commentary to Standard 7.7 states, however, that the court should not apply
less strict guidelines than the standards that police and intake officials employ at
initial stages of the juvenile court process. See id. at 88.
In its report regarding courts, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal
Justice Standards and Goals has set forth some restrictive guidelines in a commentary
that supplements one of its standards. See NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, COURTS 297-98 (1973). As a general rule, detention
should be utilized only in cases when the safety of the community is at stake. Id. at
297. Specifically, the Commission recommended that the detention of youths prior to
trial be effected only in the following three circumstances: (1) when the child has
escaped from a penal institution or facility for delinquent children; (2) when the
child is alleged to be delinquent because he committed an offense against an individ-
ual, causing such person serious medical injuries; or (3) when the child has been
found to be delinquent "three or more times within the last year or at least five times
within the past two years." Id. The Commission advised that one of the following
three purposes should underlie detention: (1) the protection of the person or property
of others or of the juvenile; (2) the supervision and care of the juvenile when no other
means to supervise the child or provide care for him exists; (3) the need to ensure that
the child will be present at future court proceedings. Id. at 297-98.
Narrow criteria for the detention of juveniles in delinquency cases were recom-
mended in the 1976 Task Force Report. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8,
Standard 12.7, at 390. One standard sets forth the risk of a child's nonappearance at
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Thirty-eight jurisdictions have codified the risk of non-appearance
at subsequent court proceedings as an appropriate basis for court-
ordered 2 7 detention. 128 This particular criterion appears in different
forms in various provisions. 2 9 An important point of variation is the
degree to which judicial discretion will be limited when a decision to
detain on the ground of nonappearance is made. 130 Some jurisdictions
subsequent court hearings as well as the need to protect others from the infliction of
injuries by the juvenile as reasons for preadjudicatory detention. Id. In addition, the
standard includes the protection of the juvenile from bodily harm and the prevention
of witness intimidation by the juvenile as appropriate bases for detention. Id. The
standard contains a restrictive postscript: when a juvenile is detained, he or she
should be placed in a residential environment that imposes as few restraints upon the
child as possible while achieving the purposes of detention. See id.
127. Statutory provisions typically include detention criteria that are to be applied
by non-court personnel who take a child into custody. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §
47.10.140(a) (1979); IDAHO CODE, Juv. CT. RULES, R. 17(a) (1980); OR. REv. STAT. §
419.569 (1981); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6326(a) (Purdon 1982).
128. See ALA. CODE § 12-15-59 (1975 & Supp. 1983); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN., Juv.
CT. RULES OF PROC., R. 3(b)(1) (Supp. 1983-1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-421 (Supp.
1983); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 636 (West Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 46b-131 (West Supp. 1983-1984); DEL. CODE ANN., FAM. CT. RULES, R. 60(a)
(1981); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-2312(e), 16-2310(a)(2) (1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-
11-18(2) (1982); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 37, 703-6, § 3-6(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-
1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-5(g)(1) (Burns Supp. 1983); IowA CODE ANN. §
232.22 (West Supp. 1983-1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-815b(c) (1981); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 208.192(4)(b) (Bobbs-Merrill 1982); LA. STAT. ANN., CODE JUV. PROC.,
art. 40(2) (West Spec. Pamphlet 1984); MD. CTS & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-
815(b)(2) (1980 & Supp. 1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3203(4)(c)(1) (West
1980 & Supp. 1982-1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.172(1) (West 1982); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 43-23-11 (1972); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-305(1)(c) (1983); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 43-205.03 (1978); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:14 (Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:4A-34(a)(1) (West 1983-1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-24(3) (1981); N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT § 320.5(3)(a) (McKinney Pt. 2 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7a-574(b)(3)
(Supp. 1983); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 27-20-14, 27-20-17(1) (1974); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 2151.31 (Page Supp. 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1107.1(A) (West
Supp. 1983-1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 419.577(6)(a) (1981); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
6325 (Purdon 1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-214(a)(2) (Supp. 1983); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 54.01(e)(1) (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1982-1983); VA. CODE § 16-1-246 (1982);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 13.40.040( 2)(a)(i), 13.40.050(1)(b) (Supp. 1983-1984);
W. VA. CODE § 49-5-8(a) (Supp. 1982); WYo. STAT. § 14-6-206(a) (1977).
129. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
130. New Mexico's relevant provision minimizes the risk that a judge will have
unfettered discretion when he implements the nonappearance criterion. It requires
that a probable cause finding be made in conjunction with the use of this criterion as
a basis for detention. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-24(A)(3) (1981). The New York
Family Court Act authorizes the making of a detention decision at the initial appear-
ance on the ground that there is a "substantial probability that ... [the juvenile] will
not appear in court on the return date .... " See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 320.5(3)(a)
(McKinney Pt. 2 1983). In Minnesota, a juvenile may be detained if "there is reason
to believe" that he will fail to appear for a court hearing. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §
260.172(1) (West 1982). Similarly, a Texas provision authorizes the detention of a
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do not explicitly set forth the risk of nonappearance as a criterion for
court-ordered detention, but utilize the standard in bail provisions.' 3 1
Other criteria for the detention of juveniles have engendered criti-
cism because they lack a sufficient degree of specificity.3 2 Broad
detention criteria are exemplified by those statutes and court rules
that authorize detention when necessary to protect both the juvenile
and the community.133 Thirty-three states have provisions that autho-
juvenile when he is "likely to abscond or be removed from the jurisdiction of the
court." See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.01(e) (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1982-1983).
131. For example, Virginia permits a child to be released on bail. See VA. CODE §
16.1-248 (1980). The probability of nonappearance constitutes one ground for a
denial of admittance to bail. See id. § 19.2-120. A child in South Dakota may, as a
matter of right, "give bond or other security for appearance at trial." See S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-8-21 (1977).
The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of
Justice has advised that bail should not be an alternative within the juvenile court
system. See DELINQUENCY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 53, at 36. In its Report, the
Commission also questioned the merits of using bail as a means of release in the
criminal justice system. Id. Within the specific context of the juvenile system, bail
should not be used to free a juvenile because it may conflict with necessary protection
or care. Furthermore, the release of the child should not be made contingent upon
the availability of economic resources of the child or of his family. Id.
132. See, e.g., Hoffman & McCarthy, supra note 29, at 272; INTERIM STATUS,
supra note 6, at 5-7. See also TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 374 (precise,
narrow criteria regarding preadjudicatory custody, detention and shelter care of
children should be established by law in each jurisdiction).
133. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-8-19.2 (1976 & Supp. 1983) (child
shall be released unless his life, safety or welfare, or protection of community
warrants such detention); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 643(a) (1981) (court shall order
detention if it determines at detention hearing that such detention would further
child's interest or that public safety and protection necessitate such detention).
The detention of a youth to preclude him from continuing to act in a delinquent or
harmful manner is called "preventive detention." See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note
8, at 390. See also WALD, supra note 55, at 124-25 (authority to detain juvenile when
possibility exists he will commit criminal offense has constituted one basis for juvenile
court action). Within the context of the federal bail system, preventive detention has
been criticized on the ground that the dangerousness of a particular individual
cannot be accurately predicted. See THE TASK FORCE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE/THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 39-40 (1978) (reprint of 1967 ed. published
by U.S. Gov't Printing Ofc., Wash., D.C.). Yet, the prediction of future criminal
activities is a basic element of the judicial system. See Hruska, Preventive Detention:
The Constitution and Congress, 3 CREICHTON L. REv. 36, 53 (1969). Although
preventive detention poses a risk that an individual will be deprived of his liberty
without due process of law, this risk can be reduced if a judicial system ensures that
persons who face the possibility of detention will be given a full judicial hearing and
that such persons will be detained only if they seriously endanger the community. Id.
at 52, 54. A distinction between detention that is instituted to prevent the evasion of
prosecution and detention that is instituted to preclude the commission of a criminal
offense may be made. See Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in the
World of John Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REv. 371, 376-77 (1970) ("detention to insure
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rize pretrial court-ordered detention when it is effected in the best
interests of the particular juvenile or is necessary to protect him. 134
prosecution for a past crime is the antithesis of detention to prevent the commission
of a future crime").The District of Columbia preventive detention scheme for adults was upheld in
United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. Ct. App. 1981) (en bane), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982). In Edwards, the appellant, a rape suspect, was
detained pursuant to a District of Columbia statute authorizing detention when no
other means exist to reasonably protect the safety of any other person or of the
community. Id. at 1342. The appellant challenged the statute on the ground that
criminal conduct cannot be accurately predicted. Id. The court rejected this argu-
ment, noting, "[p]rediction of the likelihood of certain conduct necessarily involves a
margin of error, but is an established component of our pretrial release system. Trial
judges have . . . predicted the likelihood of recidivism for capital offenses since the
Judiciary Act of 1789." Id. at 1342. The court determined that detention ordered
under the provision "seeks to curtail reasonably predictable conduct, not to punish
for prior acts." Id. at 1332. See also D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(a)(1) (1981).
For criticism directed at a preventive detention statutory scheme within the juve-
nile court system, see Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365, 372-74 (2d Cir. 1982).
Detention standards that illustrate an overall lack of specificity include those
provisions that do not mandate that the court adhere to specific criteria when
deciding whether to detain a child. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.140(d) (1979) (if
court finds that probable cause exists to believe minor is delinquent, it shall decide
whether continued detention is warranted); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 67 (Law.
Co-op. 1975 & Supp. 1983) (child shall be detained if officer who arrests child makes
written request that a child between fourteen and seventeen years of age be held in
detention and probation officer or court, authorizing arrest of such child, directs that
he be detained pending his court appearance); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-305(1)(d)
(1983) (when custody of youth has been assumed, he is not to be detained before
hearing on petition unless court orders such detention); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-21
(1981) (if child who has been taken into custody is not released, he shall be held in
detention pending hearing of case); Wyo. STAT. § 14-6-209(d) (1978) (determination
of whether child is to be placed in detention or shelter care pending additional
proceedings shall be made by court).
The vagueness that characterizes some jurisdictions' provisions is corrected to some
extent through the inclusion of another type of requirement. Although these provi-
sions do not mandate that the juvenile court premise the detention order upon
specific criteria, they do require that certain factors be assessed when deciding
whether to detain a youth. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-421(f)(10) (Supp. 1983) (at
detention hearing, inquiry regarding necessity for continued detention shall consti-
tute a review of factors that are pertinent to decision to detain, such as "[a]ny facts
indicating the possibility of violations of law if the juvenile is released without
restriction"); DEL. CODE ANN., DEL. FAM. CT. RULES, R. 60(a) (1981) (during course
of detention hearing, court must consider all evidence that is relevant to decision to
release the child, "including the child's prior delinquency record, if any, . . . the
availability of adult supervision pending a trial, the nature of the alleged miscon-
duct, the protection of the public interests and the general welfare of the child"). See
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:4A-34(e)(1-5), 2A:4A-38(a) (West Supp. 1983-1984) regard-
ing factors that must be considered by New Jersey courts when determining whether
the continued detention of a child is necessary.
134. See ALA. CODE § 12-15-59(a)(3) (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.140(a) (1979);
ARuz. REv. STAT. ANN., Juv. CT. RULES O PROC. , R. 3(b)(4) (Supp. 1983-1984); CAL.
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Nineteen states include a standard specifically directed at the protec-
tion of the community or the general public.' Five states provide
that a child may be detained if the court believes that he may commit
a crime or an offense. 1
36
WELF. & INST. CODE § 636 (West Supp. 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-103(3)(a)
(Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-131 (West Supp. 1983-1984); HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 571-32(b) (Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE, JUv. CT. RULES, R. 17(b)(4)
(1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.37, 703-6, § 3-6(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984); IND.
CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-5(g)(2) (Burns Supp. 1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-815b(c)
(1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 208.192(4)(c) (Bobbs-Merrill 1982); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 3203(4)(C)(5) (1980 & Supp. 1982-1983); MD. CTS. & JUD. PRoc. CODE
ANN. § 3-815(b)(1) (1980 & Supp. 1983); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 712A.15(a)
(West Supp. 1983-1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.172(1) (West 1982); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 43-23-11 (1972); Mo. RULES OF CT., JUv. CT. RULES, R. 111.08(d)(1) (West
1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.140(4) (1981); N.J. STAT. ANN, §§ 2A:4A-38(a) (West
Supp. 1983-1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-24(a)(1) (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-
574(b)(5) (Supp. 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1107.1(A) (West Supp. 1983-
1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-600(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 26-8-19.2 (Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-214(c)(7) (Supp. 1983-1984);
TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.01(e)(2) (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1982-1983); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-3a-30(1) (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 16.1-248(A)(3) (1980); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 33, § 643(a) (1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 13.40.040(2)(a)(ii),
13.40.050(1)(b) (Supp. 1983-1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.205(1)(a), 48.21(1)(a)
(West 1979 & Supp. 1983-1984); Wyo. STAT. § 14-6-206(a)(i) (1978).
135. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.140(a) (1979); ARiz. REV, STAT. ANN., JUv. CT.
RULES, R. 3(b)(4) (1973 & Supp. 1983-1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-103(3)(a)
(Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-131 (West Supp. 1983-1984); DEL.
CODE ANN., DEL. FAM. CT. RULES, R. 60(c) (1981); IDAHO CODE, Juv. CT. RULES, R.
17(b)(4) (1980); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-5(g)(2) (Burns Supp. 1983); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 38-815b(c)(1)(d) (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 208.192(4)(c) (Bobbs-Merrill
1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.172(1) (West 1982); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-23-11
(1981); NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.140(4) (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1107.1(A)
(West Supp. 1983-1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-600(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-8-19.2 (Supp. 1983); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
54.01(e)(4) (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1982-1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-30(1) (1977
& Supp. 1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 643(a) (1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
13.40.040(2)(a)(iii), 13.40.050(1)(b) (Supp. 1983-1984).
136. See Amz. REV. STAT. ANN., JUV. CT. RULES OF PROC., R. 3(b)(2) (West 1973
& Supp. 1983-1984) (child may be detained if probable cause exists to believe he
committed acts as alleged and "[t]hat he is likely to commit an offense injurious to
himself or others"); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-131 (West Supp. 1983-1984) (child may
be held in detention when there is "a strong probability that the child will commit or
attempt to commit other offenses... "); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 208.192(4)(c)
(Bobbs-Merrill 1982) (issue to be considered at detention hearing is possibility that
child will commit offense if not held in detention); LA. STAT. ANN., CODE JUV. PROC.
art. 40(1) (West Spec. Pamphlet 1984) (court may order that child remain in custody
prior to adjudication if serious risk exists, based upon child's previous conduct, that
release will result in child's committing an offense); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 320.5(3)(b)
(McKinney Pt. 2 1983) (court shall not order detention of respondent "unless... (b)
there is a serious risk that he may before the return date commit an act which if
committed by an adult would constitute a crime").
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Some jurisdictions have detention schemes that include the restric-
tive types of detention criteria that the drafters of recommended
provisions advocate. 37 Examples of specific criteria include standards
that authorize pretrial detention when it is necessary to protect the
person or property of others or of the juvenile. 3 Criteria that permit
detention to protect the juvenile or others from bodily harm are
particularly restrictive. 139
137. For example, in Oregon, court-ordered detention is proper "if probable cause
exists to believe the child has committed an act involving serious physical injury to
another person, the use of forcible compulsion, the use or threatened immediate use
of a deadly or dangerous weapon or arson in the first degree." OR. REV. STAT. §
419.577(6)(b) (1981). According to Wisconsin law, a judge or juvenile court commis-
sioner who conducts a hearing on the matter of continued detention may detain a
child in a secure facility if "[p]robable cause exists to believe that the child has
committed a delinquent act and either presents a substantial risk of physical harm to
another person or a substantial risk of running away as evidenced by a previous act or
attempt so as to be unavailable for a court . . . hearing .... " WIs. STAT. ANN. §§
48.208(1), 48.21(1)(a) (West 1979 & Supp. 1983-1984). For examples of the criteria
suggested by standards-recommending organizations, see supra note 126 and accom-
panying text.
138. See ALA. CODE § 12-15-59(a)(2) (1977); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 636
(West 1972 & Supp. 1984); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2310(a)(1) (1981); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 15-11-18(1) (1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, 703-6, § 3-6(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1983-1984); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 232.22(1)(d)(3), 232.44(6) (West Supp, 1983-1984);
Mo. RULES OF CT. Juv. CT. RULES, R. 111.08(d)(2) (West 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. §
41-5-305(1)(a) (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 27-20-17(2) (1974); NEB. REV. STAT. §
43-205.03 (1978); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:14 (Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:4A-34(c)(2) (West Supp. 1983-1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-24(A)(1) (1978);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.31(E), 2151.314 (1976 & Page Supp. 1982); 42 PA.
CoNs. STAT. ANN. 88 6325, 6332(a) (Purdon 1982); VA. CODE § 16.1-248(A)(2)
(1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.205(1)(a), 48.21(1)(a) (West 1979 & Supp. 1983-
1984 : WYo. STAT. 6 14-6-306(a)(ii) (1978).
139. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 374 (detention ettected to protect
public should be used only when release of youth will pose threat of bodily harm to
others).
The following provisions allow detention of juveniles prior to trial to protect the
juvenile or others from physical harm: ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN., JUv. CT. RULES OF
PROC., R. 3(b)(2) (1973 & Supp. 1983-1984) (when child "is likely to commit an
offense injurious to himself or others" he may be detained); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
39.032(2)(f)(7) (West Supp. 1983) (child may be detained if reasonable grounds to
believe exist "that the child may physically harm . . . witnesses, victims, other
persons . . ."); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.22(1)(d)(2) (West Supp. 1983-1984) (child
shall not be detained unless "[t]here is probable cause to believe the child has
committed a delinquent act, and . . . [t]here is a serious risk that the child if released
may commit an act which would inflict serious bodily harm on the child or on
another"); id. § 232.44(6) (at detention hearing, court can order detention pending
adjudicatory hearing if probable cause to believe exists that child is within court's
jurisdiction and detention is authorized under § 232.22); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 3203(4)(C)(4) (1980 & Supp. 1983-1984) (detention may be ordered when
necessary to "[p]revent the juvenile from inflicting bodily harm on others . . . ");
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:14(I)(d)(2)(iii) (Supp. 1981) (detention may be or-
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The implementation of accountability measures during the pretrial
detention stage may reduce unnecessary detention. 40 A requirement
that a decision to detain be supported by facts and reasons in the court
record ensures that a ground for appellate review of a detention order
exists.14' Three organizations that have recommended standards for
juvenile proceedings suggest that a written record supportive of a
decision to detain a youth always be made.'42 Twelve jurisdictions
dered following arraignment when prosecution establishes by clear and convincing
evidence that it is necessary to protect person or property of other individuals "from
the probability of serious bodily or other harm"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-34(c)(2)
(West Supp. 1983-1984) (juvenile may be placed or continued in detention when
physical safety of community would be at risk if juvenile were not detained and
"juvenile is charged with an offense, which if committed by an adult ...[w]ould
constitute a crime . . or . . .a high misdemeanor..."); id. § 2A:4A-38(a) (criteria
of latter section to be applied by court at detention hearing); OR. REv. STAT. §
,419.577(5)(c) (1981) ("[plrior to an adjudication of the merits, the court may order
that the child be held or placed in detention ... [if] the court makes a written
finding that the behavior of the child immediately endangers the physical welfare of
the child or of another"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-214(c)(7) (Supp. 1983) (to hold
child in secure facility or secure portion of facility, there must be "no less restrictive
alternative that will reduce the risk ...of serious physical harm to the child or to
others ..."). Alaska merely requires that the court "inform" the juvenile of the
reasons that support its probable cause finding as well as the reasons supportive of the
detention decision. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.140(c) (1979).
140. See INTERIM STATUS, supra note 4, at 14. A federal district court has held that
to comport with due process, a decision to detain a youth must be supported by the
factual record of the court. See Baldwin v. Lewis, 300 F. Supp. 1220 (E.D. Wis.
1969), rev'd on other grounds, 442 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1971). The court in Baldwin
found that the failure of both the state children's court and circuit court to establish
in the record reasons supporting detention constituted one ground for the conclusion
that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment had been violated. Id. at
1232. See also Morris v. D'Amario, 416 A.2d 137, 141 (R.I. Sup. Ct. 1980) (in context
of pre-hearing placement procedure, minimum due process safeguards should be
accorded to juvenile; if court decides detention is necessary, written facts and reasons
must support its determination).
141. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 402. See also INTERIM STATUS, supra
note 6, at 60, commentary (requirement that statement of reasons be made when
pretrial liberty is denied ensures that officials will remain accountable for such
decisions). One commentator has warned that the effectiveness'of this safeguard is
limited. He reasons that because detention decisions are not often subjected to
appellate review, when an appellate court does consider the detention judge's order,
it will rely heavily on his determination. The appellate court will defer to the latter
decision-maker's ability to assess the existence of danger and, unless the lower court
judge has blatantly abused his discretion, the decision will be upheld. Note, Preven-
tive Detention Before Trial, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1507 (1966).
142. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, Standard 12.11, at 401 (written record
of facts and reasons should be required to support court order continuing detention of
juvenile); INTERIM STATUS, supra note 6, Standard 7.7(D), at 87 ("[a] written state-
ment-of the findings of facts and reasons" should constitute part of judicial order to
detain); JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 15, Standard 3.155, at 303 (family
court judge who orders continued detention of juvenile "should explain, on the
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expressly require that an order for detention be supported by facts or
reasons. 143 The most stringent provisions require a showing of both
facts and reasons to support a decision to detain. 44 Some provisions
require the judge to set forth his reasons for issuing the detention
order. 45 Others expressly mandate that the reasons and/or facts un-
derlying his decision be in writing. 46 By requiring a written record of
the facts and reasons that precipitated a decision to detain, a jurisdic-
tion lays the groundwork for responsible decision-making during the
pretrial juvenile detention stage.
IV. Proposal for Court-Ordered Detention
When a juvenile is taken into custody for committing an offense, a
detention hearing will, in theory, significantly protect his liberty in-
terest.147 The detention hearing gives the juvenile an opportunity to
have the need for his continued detention judicially reviewed. 4 The
record, the terms of detention and the reasons for rejecting less restrictive alterna-
tives").
143. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.140(c) (1979); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 636
(West 1972 & Supp. 1984); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2312(f) (1981); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
37, 703-6, § 3-6(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
208.192(5) (Bobbs-Merrill 1982); MINN. STAT. § 260.172(2) (West 1982); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:4A-38(g) (West Supp. 1983-1984); N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 320.5(3) (McKin-
ney Pt. 2 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-577(f) (1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 419.577(6)(a)
(1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-214(c)(3) (Supp. 1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.21(5)
(West 1979).
144. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-38(g) (West Supp. 1983-1984) (when
court determines that detention is necessary, "the court order continuing the juve-
nile's detention shall be supported by reasons and findings of fact on the record");
N.Y. FAM. CT. AT § 320.5(3) (McKinney Pt. 2 1983) (court shall not order that
respondent be detained "unless it finds and states the facts and reasons for so finding
145. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2312(f) (1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-
214(c)(3) (Supp. 1983).
146. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-577(f) (1981); OR. REV. STAT. §
419.577(6)(a) (1981).
147. See LAW AND TACTIcS, supra note 2, at 185 (due process is violated if pretrial
detention is effected without hearing). See generally JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS,
supra note 15, commentary to Standard 3.155, at 303; BESHAROV, supra note 2, at
229-30.
148. See LAW AND TACTICS, supra note 2, at 184. See supra note 17 and accompa-
nying text for a description of the detention hearing.
The importance of an independent judicial inquiry when a liberty interest is at
stake is well-documented. See, e.g., Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486
(1958) (magistrate must determine whether facts relied on by complaining officer
support finding of probable cause; "[h]e should not accept without question the
complainant's mere conclusion that the person whose arrest is sought has committed
a crime"); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (fourth amendment
requires that inferences drawn from evidence "be drawn by a neutral and detached
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number of jurisdictions that authorize the holding of a detention
hearing when a juvenile is detained for a specified period has in-
creased during the past two decades. 149 Notwithstanding the value of
this type of proceeding to the juvenile and to the community, many
states do not mandate that it be held. 50
The scope of any detention hearing's protection of the due process
rights of a juvenile rests on the inclusion or exclusion of certain fea-
tures in the detention hearing scheme. Factors indicative of the degree
of protection afforded by a particular detention hearing provision
include whether the right to a detention hearing is absolute' 5 and the
time period within which it is to be held. 52 The prejudicial effect
created by a review of a juvenile's prior record, whether it pertains to
past nonappearances at court proceedings or to previous offenses, is
reduced by a probable cause determination at the onset of the deten-
tion hearing. 153
The application of restrictive detention criteria at the detention
hearing ensures that the detention decision will not be entirely subjec-
tive, but rather will represent an independent and objective determi-
nation. 54 An automatic assessment of factors regarding the back-
ground and previous conduct of the juvenile at the detention hearing
reduces the risk that a juvenile will be unnecessarily detained. 5 In
addition, a requirement that court-ordered detention be supported by
magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime"). See also Ferster, Snethen & Courtless, Juvenile
Detention: Protection, Prevention or Punishment?, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 161, 180
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Ferster] (most commentators believe detention practices
can be effectively regulated only if judicial review of initial detention decision is
mandatory).
149. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (thirty-seven jurisdictions presently
require that detention hearing be held if child is not released within certain period of
time after having been taken into custody). The increase is apparent if the conclu-
sions of this Note are compared with earlier findings pertaining to the number of
jurisdictions that mandate a detention hearing be held. See Ferster, supra note 148,
at 180 n.140 (article published in 1969 reported that twelve jurisdictions require
detention hearing be held); Hoffman & McCarthy, supra note 29, at 273 n.44 (article
published in 1975 reported that twenty-four jurisdictions require detention hearing
of some sort); Note, Due Process Dilemma, supra note 78, at 525-26 nn.42-44 (article
published in 1978 reported that twenty-six jurisdictions mandate by statute that
detained juvenile be given detention hearing).
150. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 133 and accompanying text for examples of jurisdictions that
require such a review.
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facts and reasons stated in the court record provides a basis for the
review of the decision to detain and it ensures that a specific person
remains responsible for a particular detention order.156 A periodic
review of court detention practices constitutes an additional way to
promote integrity within the judicial process.15 7
The placement of a juvenile in an adult facility magnifies the
ramifications effected by the detention experience, regardless of the
maintenance of separate quarters for adults and minors. 55 A provision
that absolutely prohibits such placement shields the juvenile from the
possibility that he will be exposed to unnecessary and destructive
experiences while being detained.
MODEL STATE PROVISION FOR COURT-ORDERED
DETENTION OF JUVENILES ALLEGED TO BE
DELINQUENT 5 9
The underlying objective of the following proposal is the reduction
of the number of unwarranted orders for the continued detention of
juveniles prior to trial. Such a reduction would serve the interests of
both the community that funds detention programs and the juvenile
who faces the possibility of detention. The mechanism used to achieve
this end is the detention hearing.
A. Definitions
1. "Juvenile" refers to a person who is over seven and less than
sixteen years of age.
2. "Delinquent" refers to a juvenile who has committed an act
which would constitute a criminal offense if committed by an
adult. 160
3. "Detention" for the purposes of this provision refers to the
placement of a juvenile alleged to be delinquent in a secure facility as
opposed to a nonsecure or shelter care unit.161
156. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
157. See Hasenfeld, The Juvenile Court Reexamined, supra note 4, at 215.
158. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
159. This proposal incorporates procedures included in current state detention
schemes and suggestions advanced by individual authorities in the area of juvenile
justice as well as by organizations responsible for the promulgation of model provi-
sions for juvenile court procedures.
160. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.2 (McKinney Pt. 2 1983).
161. A nonsecure facility theoretically is a detention facility that, as evidenced by
its design and nature, is intended to enable the accused juvenile to partake of
community life outside of the facility. The underlying purpose of such a facility is to
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4. A "secure facility" is a unit that prevents the juvenile from
leaving the premises of the facility as a result of physical restraints
stemming from the structure of the facility as well as from the imple-
mentation of regulatory procedures.6
2
B. The Detention Hearing
1. Once a juvenile has been taken into custody pursuant to an
order or warrant issued by a court or pursuant to the laws of arrest, he
or she shall be given a detention hearing before the juvenile court to
determine if his or her continued detention is necessary. Such a hear-
ing is mandatory unless the juvenile is released within twenty-four
hours of his initial detention, including Saturdays, Sundays and legal
holidays. 3 This right to a detention hearing may not be waived
unless a waiver statement is signed by the juvenile and his or her
counsel. 164
2. A juvenile shall be informed of his or her right to have counsel
present at the detention hearing. If the juvenile is not represented by
counsel, the court shall appoint an attorney as his or her legal repre-
sentative. 165
C. The Probable Cause Requirement
1. At the detention hearing, the court must determine that proba-
ble cause to believe that the alleged offense was committed exists and
that the juvenile alleged to be delinquent committed the offense be-
fore detention is justified.'
2. If probable cause has been established, the court shall review
the evidence in the case, including factors set forth in subsection "E,"
minimize the psychological effect upon the juvenile who is taken from his home on
the ground that he has allegedly committed an offense rather than to place restric-
tions upon his liberty. INTERIM STATUS, supra note 6, Standard 2.11, at 46. Tempo-
rary boarding homes constitute nonsecure facilities. Id.
162. Id. at 45.
163. See supra notes 85 & 87 and accompanying text.
164. See INTERIM STATUS, supra note 6, Standard 7.6, at 85; TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 8, Standard 12.11, at 401-02, commentary (neither juvenile nor his family
should be required to request detention hearing).
165. Model provisions require that the juvenile's counsel be present at the deten-
tion hearing. See UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT ACT, supra note 74, § 17(b) at 259;
JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 15, Standard 3.155, at 303; INTERIM STATUS,
supra note 6, Standard 7.6(c), at 85; TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, Standard
12.11, at 402.
166. See supra note 107 and accompanying text regarding the importance of
making a probable cause inquiry at the detention hearing.
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to determine if the continued detention of the juvenile is warranted
pursuant to the criteria in subsection "D."167
D. Criteria for Detention
Note: The criteria of this section may be applied to detain an alleged
juvenile delinquent only after relevant factors in subsection "E" have
been considered.
A juvenile may not be detained after a detention hearing has been
held unless, during the detention hearing, the court finds:
1. if the juvenile is released, it is substantially probable that he or
she will fail to appear at his or her next court appearance, thwarting
the prosecutorial role of the government, 16 8 or
2. a substantial probability exists that the juvenile will inflict
bodily harm upon others if not detained. 6 9
E. Factors to Be Considered Prior to the Issuance of a Detention
Order
The court shall consider the following factors prior to its issuance of a
detention order:
1. whether the juvenile has a demonstrable record of a failure to
appear at court proceedings; 170
2. whether the juvenile has a demonstrable record of committing
acts that resulted in bodily injury to others;' 7'
3. whether the juvenile previously has been adjudicated as delin-
quent; 172
4. whether the juvenile is alleged to have commited a violent
offense in the present case; 173
167. See supra note 115 and accompanying text for the significance of establishing
probable cause prior to a consideration of factors in the juvenile's background.
168. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-34(c)(1) (West Supp. 1983-1984).
169, See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 391 (possibility that juvenile will
commit property offense if not detained should not serve as basis for court-ordered
detention).
170. See JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 15, Standard 3.152(d)(ii), at
297.
171. See id., Standard 3.152(d)(iii), at 297.
172. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-34(e)(4) (West Supp. 1983-1984).
173. See id. § 2A:4A-34(e)(1); JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 15, Stan-
dard 3.152(d), at 297.
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F. Monitoring Measures
1. Any court order dictating that a juvenile be detained must be
supported by a written record of reasons and findings of fact.1
7 4
2. Detention practices, as well as other activities of the juvenile
court, are subject to a bi-monthly review, implemented by appropri-
ate state regulatory agencies. 1
75
G. The Site of Detention
1. When a juvenile alleged to be delinquent is to be detained in a
secure facility, such facility must be:
a. operated by a licensed child welfare agency or must be a unit
that has received court approval, or
b. operated under the supervision of the juvenile court or other
public authority or private agency and approved by the State's public
welfare department. 17
2. Detention in a jail or other adult facility is absolutely prohib-
ited under any circumstances.177
V. Conclusion
The detention hearing constitutes a means to prevent the groundless
detention of juveniles. Its effectiveness is minimal, however, unless
restrictions are placed upon the discretionary power of the decision-
maker who exercises his authority during the hearing. A requirement
that a detention hearing automatically be held when a juvenile taken
into custody is not released within twenty-four hours discourages
discretionary abuses at the initiation of the juvenile court process. To
prevent an arbitrary exercise of discretionary authority at the deten-
tion hearing itself, the detention hearing scheme must include a prob-
able cause inquiry, an application of narrow criteria and a consider-
ation of factors pertaining to the individual juvenile. Any decision to
detain should be supported by facts and reasons stated explicitly in the
court record.
To circumscribe the authority of juvenile court decision-makers
during the detention hearing and to prevent an unnecessary continua-
174. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ratio-
nale underlying such a requirement.
175. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
176. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6327(a) (Purdon 1982) (section authorizes
specific, acceptable locations for detention).
177. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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tion of detention, the hearing must conform to specific procedures
each time it is held. Although the juvenile court system will lose some
of its flexibility and informality to accomodate these requirements,
this loss is necessary in view of the high cost of unwarranted detention
decisions to both the juvenile and the community.
Carol Bombardi

